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JUDGE POSNER'S DISSENTING JUDICIAL OEUVRE
AND THE AESTHETICS OF CANONICITY
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST*
In the autumn of 2001, Judge Richard A. Posner completed twenty years of
judicial service and started his third decade on the federal appellate bench. During
his tenure as a judge, Posner's output of scholarly books' and articles2 has continued
to flow like a waterfall, attracting widespread attention.3 Moreover, Posner's judicial
opinions have been noticed for their perspicacity and edifying style.4 In particular,
his dissenting judicial opinions are unusually powerful and persuasive.
In this Article, I extend and refine the project that I started in the Missouri Law
Review (where I examined the judicial opinion style of Judge Posner's dissenting
opinions during his first decade on the bench, 1981 through 1991)' with a fresh
critique of his dissenting judicial opinion style during his last dozen years as a judge,
from 1992 through 2003. The fivefold aim and structure of this Article is as follows.
First, Part I provides a statistical overview of Judge Posner's appellate decisions
during this twenty-two year (to date) judicial career. I am particularly interested in
charting the frequency of his dissenting opinions. Second, Part I summarizes Judge
Posner's dissenting judicial opinion style during his early years on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Third, Part H analyzes and evaluates
Judge Posner's dissenting judicial opinion style during 1992 through 2003-his
more mature years as a jurist. Fourth, Part IV draws some conclusions about Judge
Posner's evolving dissenting judicial opinion style and comment on the implications
of my work for increased understanding of the aesthetics of judicial dissenting
opinions. Finally, Part V offers some thoughts in relation to the corpus of Judge
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.S. University of Pennsylvania (Wharton
School), 1973. J.D. Cornell University, 1977. My thanks go to Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, Richard A. Posner, and
Thomas Ulen for helpful and insightful comments regarding an earlier draft. I am grateful to my research assistants,
Genevieve Boarman and Jon R. Rogers, for their invaluable assistance.
1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004) [hereinafter CATASTROPHE];
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS (2001);
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY (2001), RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIc INTELLECTUALS: A
STUDY OF DECLINE (2001). Posner has authored more than forty books. For a complete list, see University of
Chicago Law School, Publications, Presentations and Works in Progress, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/
posner-r/ppw.html [hereinafter Publications].
2. See, e.g., Publications, supra note 1 (listing more than 400 law review articles and essays published by
Posner to date).
3. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism, 71 U. CII. L REV. 639 (2004)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,702 (2003) (discussing Posner's writings on law and economics
in torts).
4. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Playing On Words: Judge Richard A. Posner's Appellate Opinions,
1981-82-Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CINN. L.
REv. 651, 654, 732-35 (2000) [hereinafter Sexy Style]; Supreme Stats, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 31
(utilizing baseball statistical methodology to rank Judge Posner "#1" for opinion productivity, opinion quality, and
independence among circuit court judges likely to be considered for a Supreme Court vacancy). Although not
nominated for the most recent vacancies, recent writings by Professors Stephen J. Choi and Mitu Gulati argue that
Judge Posner would be the most qualified federal appellate judge in America to be elevated to the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Justice RichardA. Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. SURV.
OF AM. L. 19 (2005) [hereinafter Unpacking the Statistics]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next
Supreme Court Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 23 (2005) [hereinafter Choosing].
5. See Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner Style: Judge Richard A. Posner's First Decade of Dissenting
Judicial Opinions, 1981-1991-Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73 (2004)
[hereinafter Dissent Aesthetics].
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Posner's dissenting opinion style as it has evolved over two decades on the
aesthetics of judicial canonicity. In this final Part, I seek to bypass contentious
ideological debates about what might be characterized as the "canon" of stellar
judicial opinions and to explore, in relation to the dissenting judicial opinions of
Judge Posner, how aesthetic pleasure plays into what we in the legal community
find valuable, how this can change over time, and how chance works on the
formation of the judicial canon.
This Article also has two further, secondary proposes: (1) to provide data and
analysis for the President of the United States in nominating Judge Posner for a
future vacancy on the Supreme Court, and (2) to provide U.S. senators with helpful
information in assessing Posner's character, fitness, and merit for confirmation as
Justice Posner.
I. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW
During the twenty-two year survey period of Judge Posner's service as a United
States Court of Appeals Judge-from his starting date during the autumn of 1981
until the end of 2003 (technically, slightly longer than twenty-two years)-Judge
Richard A. Posner wrote a total of 1,988 published opinions, or an average of about
ninety opinions per year.6 Of these 1,988 opinions, Judge Posner authored 1,847
opinions for the Seventh Circuit majority.7 Posner wrote a total of 141 published
separate opinions during this timeframe.8 These separate opinions consisted of
6. See Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 93. I calculated these figures based on a hand count of all
published authored opinions by Judge Posner on the Westlaw federal court Seventh Circuit database of published
opinions. The following table summarizes this information:
YEAR MAJORTY CONCURRENCE CONCURRENCE DISSENT TOTAL % SEPARATE % DISSENTS
/DISSENT OPINIONS1791 3__7 _ 0 r .0 .0
1982 77 2 0 6 85 9 7
1983 ~ 81 7 3 ----_ _ 8.33%
1984 77 4 1 5 8T 11.49% - 6019853 88 6 0 9 10 14-568 8.4%
1986 78 3 1 4 86 9.30% 581%1987 79 4 0 2 85 7.06% 2.35%
1988 72 T 2 3 80 10.00% 6.25%
19897 0 3 7 7 3
I W6 3 0 5 8.51% 5.32%
_7 1 4 79 7.59% 6.33%
1992 71 1 0 6 84 8.33% 7.14
9 98 0 0 3 101 2.97% 2.97%
1994 100 2 0 1 103 2.91% 0.97%
199T 89 2-1 2 94 5.32% 3.19%
1996 o0 0 0 2 105 - 1.9% 1.90%
1997 8o 0 1 0 89 1.1-.12%
998 1 0 2 86 3.49% 2.33%199W 2 0 5 99 * 7 14% ---. 1
2000 80 1 1 2 84 4.76% 3.57%
2001 8 2 l ! 88 4.55% 2.27%
2002 89 1 1 3 94 5.32% 4.26%
203 79 2 1 5 86 8.14% 5.81%
Total 1,847 so 13 78 1,8 7.0% 4.58%
7. Id.
8. Id.
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seventy-eight dissenting opinions, fifty pure concurring opinions, and thirteen mixed
concurring/dissenting opinions. 9
The distribution of Judge Posner's eighty-two dissenting and mixed concurring/
dissenting opinions over his first twenty years on the federal bench is illuminating.
From late 1981 through the end of 1986, he wrote a total of thirty-four dissenting
opinions (41.5% of all his dissenting opinions during his first twenty years as a
judge).' From 1987 through the end of 1991, he wrote twenty dissenting opinions
(24.4% of all his dissenting opinions during his first twenty years as a judge). From
1992 through the end of 1996, he wrote fifteen dissenting opinions (18.3% of all his
dissenting opinions during his first twenty years as a judge), and from 1997 through
the end of 2001, he authored thirteen dissenting opinions (15.9% of all his dissenting
opinions during his first twenty years as a judge)." Thus, as Judge Posner's tenure
on the bench has lengthened, he has tended to write fewer dissenting opinions.' 2
The following figures (assembled from the statistical data in the table in footnote
6) provide a graphic depiction of Judge Posner's output of various types of judicial
opinions:
FIGURE 1
Judge Posner Majority Opinions
0.O -
z
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22
Year on the Bench
9. Id.
10. For the purposes of these calculations, "dissenting opinions" includes both pure dissents and mixed
concurring/dissenting opinions. See infra note 11.
11. Id. My statistics do not reflect whether Judge Posner's dissenting opinions were dissents from panel
majority opinions, dissents from en banc majority opinions, partial concurring and dissenting opinions, or dissents
from majority opinions declining to reverse a panel opinion en banc. However, in the discussion that follows, I do
make these distinctions.
12. While we must wait for data through the end of 2006 to make a comparable five year comparison with
Posner's earlier five-year timeframes, it appears that his output of dissenting opinions will likely increase during
2002-2006 since he has already written nine dissenting opinions during 2002-2003 (four dissenting opinions during
2002 and five dissenting opinions during 2003). See supra note 6 and accompanying text. As I speculated in an
earlier article:
A possible reason for Posner's decreasing rate and number of dissenting opinions is his increased
satisfaction with Seventh Circuit opinions. Posner's increased satisfaction, in turn, is probably
related to both his own persuasiveness in convincing his colleagues to adopt his reasoning on
assorted legal issues and to the appointment of more like-minded judges to the Seventh Circuit
(as well as the Supreme Court).
Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 94.
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FIGURE 2
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 4
Judge Posner Concurring Opinions
J~ -- -------------------------------
0 C
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 2
Year on the Bench
Judge Posner Con/Dis Opinions
----------.. . ..--....- ....------------------ .. - 2-------
Year on the Bench
Judge Posner Dissenting Opinions
-- -- - -- ---- --- - --- -- -- - -- -- --
0,
E
2'
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22
Year on the Bench
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II. A SYNOPSIS OF JUDGE POSNER'S EARLY
DISSENTING OPINION STYLE, 1981-1991
During his first two years as a federal appellate judge, Judge Posner was mainly
motivated to write dissenting opinions to satisfy a cathartic need to evince
dissatisfaction with sloppy, shopworn, or inefficient legal reasoning. 3 Commencing
in 1983, Posner's dissenting style became more confident and caustic. 4 Among the
multiple dissenting voices that he employed during his first five years on the bench,
from 1981 through 1986, were the following: Posner the Academic, 5 Posner the
Tendentious Economist, 16 Posner the Taskmaster, 17 Posner the Cassandra, 8 Posner
the Humanitarian, 9 and Posner the Epistemologist.2" Opinions that epitomize the
panache of JudgePosner's dissenting style during 1981 through 1986 were United
States v. Markgraf (a dissent that vigorously championed the rights of a farm couple
by imagining how this couple might feel about having their home foreclosed and
how Congress would have preferred the dispute to be resolved); 2 Geras v. Lafayette
Display Fixtures, Inc. (an opinion where Posner adroitly employed irony to
sympathize with the majority jurists while insisting upon the recognition of strict
constitutional principles); 22 Haffner v. United States (a dissent that triggered a belly
laugh at the folly of the majority's approach to statutory interpretation); 23 and United
States v. Green (an opinion where Posner brilliantly utilized an assortment of
stylistic devices to uncover the injustice of a conviction for mail fraud).24 Yet, Judge
Posner also authored some ugly dissenting opinions during this timeframe-
exemplified by his stylistics in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago2 and
Chaulk v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.26 -that were tarnished by inappropriately
aggressive personal attacks.
During 1987 through 1991, the second part of his first decade as a federal
appellate judge, Judge Posner's dissenting opinion style was generally most
persuasive when he used empathy as a technique, as in Anilina Fabrique de
Colorants v. Aakash Chemicals & Dyestuffs, Inc.27 and Wyletal v. United States.21
13. This Part is a distillation of my earlier article on Posner's dissenting judicial opinion style. See generally
Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5.
14. Id at 97.
15. See, e.g., Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332, 1336-41 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769-71 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Knop, 701 F.2d 670, 676-77 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1449-56 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting), aJfdby
equally divided court, 466 U.S. 377 (1984).
19. See, e.g., DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 206-10 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 207.
21. 736 F.2d 1179, 1186-88 (7th Cir. 1984) (denial of reh'g en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting).
22. 742 F.2d 1037, 1045-54 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting).
23. 757 F.2d 920, 921-23 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
24. 786 F.2d 247, 255-460 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting).
25. 733 F.2d 1187, 1192-97 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. 808 F.2d 639, 643-45 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting).
27. 856 F.2d 873, 882-84 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting).
28. 907 F.2d 49, 51-53 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Conversely, his dissenting opinion style was generally least compelling during this
period when he directly or indirectly made personal attacks-as in Reilly v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin29 and Visser v. Packer Engineering
Associates, Inc.
30
Three Posnerian dissenting opinions during his first decade on the federal
appellate bench demonstrate aesthetic sublimity: International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc. ;31 In re Sanderfoot;32 and United States v. Marshall.33 In
crafting all three of these dissents in cases that all eventually were heard by the
Supreme Court-with two out of three of the cases being reversed by the High
Court34 -Judge Posner demonstrated virtuosity in being able to masterfully combine
numerous stylistic techniques in dissenting performances that were greater than the
sum of the individual parts of the respective dissenting opinions. Moreover, in each
of the aforementioned dissenting opinions, Judge Posner employed connoisseurship
in being able to expertly judge the appeal and persuasiveness of his various stylistic
techniques.
By the end of his first decade as a federal appellate judge, Posner had learned to
instill life and power into his dissenting opinions by deploying a variety of attractive
stylistic techniques. Occasionally during this timeframe, however, Judge Posner
lapsed into issuing dissenting opinions that were grating, displeasing, and downright
unattractive. In his best dissenting opinions during 1981 through 1991, Posner
displayed astute calculation in gauging the winning effect his prose would
have-entertaining his readers and persuasively sketching for them pictures of
disparate human behaviors and motives. In his finest dissenting opinions, Posner
gave thoughtful attention to rhetoric, writ large (in the grand Aristotelean sense of
ethos, pathos, and logos), as well as dexterity to particularized rhetorical techniques
such as amplification; balance; paradox; brevity; emotional appeals; allusion and
citation to authority; metaphorical substitutions and puns; and repetition of letters,
syllables, words, and ideas.35
The Posnerian dissenting signature during his first ten years as a judge
might-depending upon whether a critic were a connoisseur of military strategy,
wine tasting, film, furniture, or swimming-be described in some, or all, of the
following ways: "precision bombing runs," "citric with a memorable aftertaste," "a
clockwork green (as in economics)," "severely utilitarian," and "delightfully
bracing. 36 Posner's most effective dissenting opinions during his first decade as a
judge were those that utilized style as a handmaiden of morality. Those dissents paid.
serious attention to the integrity and honesty of argumentation, rather than engaging
in self-conscious posturing of positions.
29. 846 F.2d 416, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. 909 F.2d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting).
31. 886 F.2d 871, 902-08 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
32. 899 F.2d 598, 606-07 (7th Ci. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500
U.S. 291 (1991).
33. 908 F.2d 1312, 1331-38 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), affd sub nom. Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
34. See supra notes 31-33.
35. See Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 157-59.
36. Id. at 160.
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In a word, over the course of his first decade on the bench, Judge Posner became
more pragmatic in the fights he picked with the majority, in the stylistics of his
dissents, and in his role as a collegial judge.
Ill. JUDGE POSNER'S MATURING DISSENTING JUDICIAL
OPINION STYLE, 1992-2003
During 1992 through 2003, Judge Posner matured in the ways he wrote dissenting
opinions by improving his appeal to "practical reason," a term that Posner himself
described as a quality "[b]etween the extremes of logical persuasion and emotive
persuasion" when he assessed the judicial opinions style of his hero, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.37 In the discussion that follows, I will focus, in rough
chronological order, on a few of Judge Posner's aesthetically noteworthy dissents
written during this period. As a departure from my earlier scholarship on Posner's
dissenting judicial opinion style, I will forego analysis of specific rhetorical
techniques manifested in his dissents. Instead, I will concentrate on Posner' s appeals
in his dissenting opinions to broad, emotionally, and logically salient themes that are
attractive and memorable (and, on occasion, unattractive and forgettable).
A. An Appeal to Simple Justice
In 1992, Judge Posner authored a pure dissenting opinion from a panel majority
decision in a prisoner's rights case, Hamilton v. O'Leary.38 Posner's dissent deftly
employed the logic of probabilities with an elegantly understated concern for the
justice of revoking a state inmate's good time credits for constructive possession of
an assortment of homemade weapons found in a vent in the common area of the
prison.39 The context of the case was a section 1983 action for damages against
37. RiCHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND LITERATURE 272 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1998) [hereinafter LAw AND
LUERATURE].
38. 976 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cit. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting). During 1992, Judge Posner authored five
additional pure dissenting opinions: Crane v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1326 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J., dissenting) (objecting to federal court interference in a high school athletic association's decision
to disallow a student to play golf after he transferred school districts); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1159 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that federal bankruptcy court judges
could not conduct jury trials); In re Grabill Corp., 976 F.2d 1126, 1128 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority's denial of rehearing en banc); BUllish v. City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269, 1302 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with panel majority's decision to affirm the grant of a summary
judgment for the defendant in a reverse discrimination lawsuit by white firefighters), vacated and reh 'g en banc
granted, 962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992); and United States v. 7326 Highway 45 North, 965 F.2d 311,320 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the reversal of summary judgment in favor of the government in
a drug forfeiture case).
39. As explained in the majority opinion, the weapons were found during a "shakedown" at the Stateville
Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois, where Edward Hamilton was imprisoned at the time. Hamilton, 976 F.2d at
343 (majority opinion). Hamilton shared Cell C-227 with three other inmates. Id.
Cell C-227 is on the second of four galleries-that is, there are two floors of cells above the
second gallery and one floor of cells below. From Cell C-227, Hamilton and his cellmates have
access to a large vent. The vent runs the entire vertical length of the four galleries, from the
fourth gallery down to the first gallery, and between two cells on each floor. Thus, Hamilton
alleges, the prisoners in eight cells, a total of 32 prisoners, have access to some part of the vent.
Id. The six homemade weapons found by two correctional officers consisted of a 16.5-inch steel pipe, a 7.5-inch
file, an I 1-inch sharpened rod, and three 9.5-inch shanks. Id.
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various prison officials.' The majority concluded that the state disciplinary
committee below had sufficient evidence of Hamilton's guilt to conclude that he
constructively possessed the contraband weapons and, therefore, deserved to have
his good behavior credits revoked.4' Thus, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Hamilton's civil rights complaint.42 Posner's discussion of probabilities
in his Hamilton dissent is piercing. Noting that the prisoner alleged that a total of
two cell blocks on one floor of the prison (with each cell block containing four
prisoners) had "equal access to the vent in which the weapons were found," Judge
Posner concluded that the state disciplinary committee had insufficient evidence to
dock Hamilton of his good behavior credits by stating that, "[o]n the record before
the committee, the probability that the plaintiff had possessed one or more of these
weapons cannot be reckoned as greater than one in eight, or 12.5 percent."43 While
musing that, in prison circumstances, "purely collective guilt" might be theoretically
"deemed to satisfy due process," Posner observed that the state officials in the
instant case had not advanced that line of argument. Distinguishing a Supreme
Court case used by the panel majority to bolster its holding and reasoning, Judge
Posner differentiated the facts at bar through his perspicacious analysis of human
nature and statistical probabilities. The case involved three inmates who were all
"seen fleeing the scene of the crime. 4 5 Posner reasoned in his dissent:
Each [of the fleeing inmates in the Supreme Court case] was thus acting guilty;
the probability that each was guilty was considerable. Here it is entirely possible
that only one of the eight inmates who had access to the vent possessed the six
weapons, and there is no evidence to suggest that Hamilton was more likely to
be that one than any of the seven other inmates were. Nor is it argued that the six
weapons are likely to have been jointly owned by all inmates having access to
the place where they were kept.'
Posner, no patsy on criminals or prison inmates, could have easily found a way
to agree with the panel majority by emphasizing the deferential standard of review
enjoyed by the prison disciplinary committee. What makes his dissenting opinion
memorable, however, is his willingness to insist on scrupulous inferences and
standards of proof for Hamilton, a hapless, lowly, and forgotten prisoner who had
the misfortune of being pegged as guilty by proximity in a situation where other
locationally proximate prisoners did not suffer as serious penal consequences.47
40. Id. at 342; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
41. See Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 342.
42. Id. at 343.
43. Id. at 347 (Posner, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. (distinguishing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,454 (1985)).
46. Id.
47. Posner's dissent continued an attractive characteristic demonstrated in his earlier dissenting opinions
of being concerned for relatively insignificant litigants, as well as significant ones, and affording each an equal
measure of justice. See, e.g., Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 99-102 (discussing his dissent in DePass v. United
States, 721 F.2d 203, 206 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) (a Federal Tort Claims Act case where a plaintiff
was negligently struck by a car driven by a federal employee, suffering, among other injuries, a traumatic
amputation of his left leg below the knee)); id. at 108-09 (discussing his dissent in United States v. Markgraf, 736
F.2d 1179, 1186 (7th Cir. 1984) (denial of reh'g en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting) (a mortgage foreclosure action
against a destitute farm couple)).
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B. A Plea for "Biting the Bullet"
In 1993, Judge Posner dissented, in part, from an en banc decision of the Seventh
Circuit, after rehearing, in the products liability case Todd v. Socilt, BIC, S.A.,
involving the alleged wrongful death of a child who was playing with a butane
lighter.18 It is instructive to analyze the style of this dissenting opinion for two
reasons. First, Posner's dissent is of a rare sort: a formal disagreement with an en
banc opinion of his Seventh Circuit colleagues. Second, his dissenting opinion
covers interesting substantive tort issues of products liability, as well as fascinating
legal process questions of judicial review and federalism.
At the beginning of his Todd partial dissent, Judge Posner adroitly agreed with
the en banc majority's disposition to dismiss the plaintiff's first theory of strict
liability ("that BIC should have warned customers about the risks lighters pose to
households with children").49 He then incorporated by reference a separate partial
dissent of a colleague in the case who would have affirmed the grant of summary
judgment against plaintiff's second strict liability theory involving design defect for
failing to make lighters child-resistant. ° Next, Posner articulated the focus of his
separate opinion: an essay5' about why "[t]o certify abstract questions" of tort law
"about the consumer-contemplation test and the risk-utility test to the state supreme
court is to misunderstand the nature of common law adjudication."52
Assuming the mantle of what he has termed "an everyday-pragmatist judge" 53 in
the body of his opinion, Judge Posner initially railed against judicial resolution of
legal questions devoid of factual concreteness. In the following vivid passage of his
Todd dissent, Posner philosophized in an accessible, sympathetic, and jargon-free
manner, about the relative competencies of judges and legislators:
Judges lack many things that legislators have, but one thing we have is first-hand
experience with the facts crystallized in adversary litigation. In areas where the
making of substantive rules--"legislating," in a sense-is left to judges, it is
because the experience generated by the hearing of cases is thought an adequate
or even a superior substitute for the sources of information and persuasion to
which legislators turn (or are turned). Common law rules and principles well up
48. 9 F.3d 1216, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affd, 21 F.3d
1402 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover, during 1993, Judge Posner wrote two pure dissenting opinions: EEOC v. Illinois,
986 F.2d 187, 190 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J., dissenting) (dissenting from affirmation of summary judgment for
state holding that special state police officers were subject to mandatory retirement), and Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d
1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J., dissenting in part) (disagreeing with outcome in civil rights case appeal
involving a claim by motorists who were injured in an automobile collision with a drunk driver who brought an
action against a police officer who had failed to arrest the drunk driver).
49. Todd, 9 F.3d at 1217 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 1225 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The separate opinion that Posner
incorporated by reference on the design defect issue was Judge Manion's partial dissent. See id at 1227 (Manion,
J., dissenting in part).
51. For a discussion of Judge Posner's penchant for writing judicial opinions in the form of essays, see
Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 110.
52. Todd, 9 F.3d at 1225 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
53. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 12 (2003) [hereinafter LAW, PRAGMATISM
AND DEMOCRACY].
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out of the judge's experience with the facts of actual cases and are honed by the
experience of encountering different facts in later cases.'
For Judge Posner, it made no sense for the Seventh Circuit to certify to the
Supreme Court of Illinois a request to make general "rules applicable to all non-
purchasers of dangerous or defective products and to all consumer products whose
risk can be appreciated by their intended users. 55 Rather, what mattered for him was
the particular factual texture and nuanced details of the present case. As he
explained with almost novelistic flair and colloquial directness:
[This] is a case about a small child who used a cigarette lighter to set a fire that
killed another small child. The only issue we ought to be concerned with is
whether the state supreme court would permit such a case to go to a jury. I
say-with diffidence, in view of the disagreement within our court-that the
answer is fairly clearly "no. 56
Concerned about the legal process issues of institutional competence and settle-
ment,57 Posner expressed alarm and succeeded, by his use of cascading analysis and
incisive questions, in arousing mild consternation about the potential ramifications
of the majority's certification decision. He wrote:
As is plain from the long footnote in the majority opinion, the respective costs
and benefits of child-resistant cigarette lighters raise difficult questions that a
jury could not responsibly answer, and underneath them is the broader question
how far, and through what institutional means, society should go to make
ordinary household products child-proof (or child-resistant). If lighters are to be
made child proof, can kitchen knives, microwave ovens, and electrical sockets
be far behind? Is a comprehensive national program of protecting children from
the menaces of everyday life to be formulated and administered by-juries?58
Turning to his perennial concern about judicial efficiency,59 Judge Posner opined
that the "purpose of the certification procedure is not to dump our cases, even our
54. Todd, 9 F.3d at 1225 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id.
57. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sack's classic work provided the first comprehensive scholarly
consideration of the importance of comparative institutional strengths and weaknesses. HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William
N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2001) (1958). These scholars articulated a number of vital insights that, in
recognition of their fundamental interdependence with others, "people form themselves into groups for the
protection and advancement of their common interests, or they accept membership in groups formed by others,"
id. at 2, and that individuals establish "the institutionaliz[ation] [of] procedures for the settlement of questions of
group concern." Id. at 3. Continuing their social theory, Hart and Sacks noted that since "different procedures and
personnel of different qualifications invariably prove to be appropriate for deciding different kinds of questions,"
it follows "that every modern society differentiates among social questions, accepting one mode of decision for one
kind and other modes for others-for example, courts for 'judicial' decisions and legislatures for 'legislative'
decisions." Id. Judge Posner's passage obviously draws upon this seminal line of thought and is written in what
might be called a legal process style.
58. Todd, 9 F.3d at 1225-26 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
59. For earlier Posnerian dissents based on concerns of judicial efficiency, see, for example, United States
v. Board of School Commissioners, 677 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting), and Anilina
Fabrique de Colorants v. Aakash Chemicals & Dyestuffs, Inc., 856 F.2d 873, 882 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
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diversity cases, on state courts."' Rather, instead of "convert[ing] certification to
abstention" by ill-advised certification to a state supreme court, Posner claimed that
the proper "purpose of certification is to identify controlling issues that can be
resolved without immersion in the details of the case," such as interpretation of the
meaning of a state statute.6 ' But, according to Judge Posner, "[c]ertification is rarely
if ever appropriate in a fact-laden common law case, such as" the case at bar.62 In
concluding his dissent Posner was frank, direct and concise:
I voted to rehear the case en banc; I think we should bite the bullet and decide
it now. By certifying these questions to the Supreme Court of Illinois we merely
delay the resolution of the case, impair the proper operation of the common law
process and, burden another court. 63
C. A Call for Purposeful Statutory Construction
In 1994 Judge Posner dissented from a panel opinion authored by his colleague,
Frank Easterbrook, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman,64 which held that a
federal banking statute provided the appropriate standard of care in suits by the
federally-created Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) against officers and directors
of insolvent federally chartered financial institutions.65 Judge Posner has an abiding
intellectual interest in questions of statutory interpretation. 66 It seems that he relishes
a good statutory puzzle. In Chapman, he viewed the matter in a vastly different light
than his fellow judges.67 In a nutshell, Posner thought it was "Crazy!" to "turn[ ]"
the purpose of a federal banking statute "on its head" by allowing directors of
federal financial institutions to enjoy the protection of a lax federal standard of care,
"gross negligence," instead of the background state standard (the law of the state of
incorporation of the federal financial institution) of simple negligence.68 In reaching
the aforementioned conclusion, Judge Posner started by framing the issue on appeal
in a straightforward and vivid manner:
The issue presented by the appeal in this directors' liability suit is the standard
of care to which to hold the directors of savings and loan associations in Illinois
sued by the Resolution Trust Corporation. The Security Savings & Loan
Association received a charter from the State of Illinois in 1880, and opened for
business that year in Peoria. A century later, in 1982, Security exchanged its
state charter for a federal one. Seven years later it went broke and passed into the
60. Todd, 9 F.3d at 1226 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. id. at 1227.
64. 29 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). This dissenting opinion was Posner's sole
pure dissent for the year; he did not author any partial concurring and partial dissenting opinions during 1994.
65. Id. at 1123-24 (majority opinion).
66. See, e.g., LAw, PRAGMATISM AND DEMoCRACY, supra note 53, at 62-63,67-68,74,82,271-74; Richard
A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MiCH. L REv.
952 (2003); Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 146-49.
67. Judge Rovner wrote a concurring opinion, wherein he claimed, "Although I join Judge Easterbrook's
opinion, I am sympathetic to the sentiments expressed by the dissent." 29 F.3d at 1125 (Rovner, J., concurring).
Rovner concluded, "I am ultimately unpersuaded by the dissent, however, as I agree with Judge Easterbrook that
the internal affairs doctrine compels application of federal law to the internal affairs of a federally-chartered
financial institution." Id.
68. Id. at 1127 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
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hands of the RTC, which brought this suit against Security's former directors to
obtain damages for their negligent mismanagement of Security's lending and
investment activities during the period, as it happens, after Security became a
federal S&L. The directors' negligence is alleged to have harmed Security's
shareholders, to whose rights the RTC has succeeded, and it is that harm which
the suit seeks to redress. The question we are asked to decide is whether the
defendants can be held liable for simple negligence, in light of 12 U.S.C. §
1821 (k), passed the year Security went broke and conceded (at least for purposes
of this appeal) to be applicable to this suit.69
Posner then described the origins of the new federal banking statute as
"empower[ing] the RTC to sue the directors of federally insured financial
institutions for gross negligence or any greater disregard of duty."7 He went on to
point out, however, that because of the federal statute's savings clause, "nothing in
this section shall impair or affect any right of the RTC under other applicable law."'"
The legislation's savings clause, according to Posner, worked as follows if a
federally insured institution was state chartered: "if a state tries to immunize the
directors of such institutions from liability for any nonintentional act, even if grossly
negligent, the RTC can still sue; and...it can sue for simple negligence if applicable
state law makes the directors liable for simple negligence."72 In Judge Posner's
view, the more troublesome question was what happened if "the institution [had] a
federal charter instead of a state charter?" 73 Rejecting recent precedent of the
Seventh Circuit, Posner would have allowed the RTC to utilize Illinois law that
"ma[de] the directors of financial institutions.. .liable to shareholders for simple
negligence."a7
Laying out the specific reasons for his dissent, Judge Posner first interpreted the
purpose of section 1821(k)-"as the timing of the statute's enactment and other
features of its [legislative] history make clear" 75 -to be "plac[ing] afloor under the
liability of directors of savings and loan associations, which were falling like
ninepins. ''76 He followed up this colorful metaphor by surveying the mischief that
Congress sought to cure77 and paraphrased the bill's sponsor in the Senate by stating
that "[t]he purpose of the new federal statute was to preempt those [state] laws to the
extent they shielded directors from liability for gross negligence or worse
misconduct. 7 8 Moreover, Posner discerned the purpose of the savings clause to
section 1821 (k) as "ensur[ing] that if a state went further than the federal statute, and
69. Id. at 1125.
70. Id. (citing David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New Defense for
Directors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions-Or a Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1703 (1992)).
71. Id. (alteration omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1126.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. According to Posner's dissenting opinion: "A number of states had, beginning in the early 1980s,
passed laws limiting the liability of corporate directors for mismanagement of corporate affairs." Id.
78. Id.
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punished simple negligence by directors, the RTC could use state rather than federal
law."'79
Midway through his dissenting opinion, Judge Posner offered a thoughtful essay
on why Congress did not spell out in the new banking statute "[t]he liability of
directors of S & Ls which happened to have federal rather than state charters.... 80
In the course of his analysis, Posner made the case for a pragmatic judicial statutory
construction:
The likeliest reason for the apparent oversight [regarding the liability of S&L
directors of federally chartered banks] is that there was no history of having to
decide which jurisdiction's law would govern a particular dispute over directors'
liability. Directors' liability had been primarily a common law field; the
pertinent common law doctrines (the business-judgment rule, the duty of loyalty,
etc.) had been similar across states.. .and banks and related financial institutions
were invariably local rather than multistate, so potential interstate conflicts in the
obligations of bank directors could not arise. Congress is not gifted with
omniscience and does not have the leisure to be able to tie a pretty ribbon
around every piece of legislation, and so it often either overlooks or chooses not
to attempt to solve problems that lack present salience or urgency. The use by
judges of the form of words that Congress has employed to deal with the
problem that was before it-in this case, the problem of states' curtailing the
liabilities of directors-to solve a problem of which there is no evidence that
Congress was even aware is a formula for the perversion of legislative purpose.
We play "Gotcha!" with Congress. We make traps of its words."'
As Posner saw it: "Congress believed that by passing Section 1821(k) it was
empowering the RTC to obtain damages whenever directors were grossly negligent
(or worse), regardless of the provisions of state law. ' 2 In his view, "[t]here [was]
no evidence that Congress believed it was creating a new immunity for directors of
federal S&Ls by depriving the RTC of the benefit of state laws that imposed higher
duties on directors. 8 3
Judge Posner's dissent in Chapman is memorable for its argumentative
combination of understated emotion (the derelict S&L directors should not be able
to achieve immunity for their negligent supervision) and subtle logic (the judiciary
should consider what problem Congress was trying to address and not read the
words of the statute out of context).
D. A Protest Against Human Indignity
In 1995 Judge Posner authored a partial concurring and dissenting opinion from
a panel opinion in Johnson v. Phelan, which held that monitoring of naked male
prisoners by female guards was not a violation of the prisoners' constitutional rights,
thereby dismissing the prisoner's complaint for failure to state a claim. 84 This
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id
83. Id.
84. 69 F.3d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). During 1995,
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Posnerian dissent is notable for both its imaginative empathy with common
prisoners (refusing to view incarcerated human beings as disenfranchised "others")
and its inspired logic in seeking to fathom the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, all coupled with its common sense
approach in construing the potential impact of the decision on equal job
opportunities for women prison guards.8"
Posner started his partial dissent by agreeing with his panel colleagues:
"Johnson's equal protection claim has no possible merit,... there is no possible basis
for imputing liability to the president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners,
and.. .the claims against the defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed
as unauthorized suits against the State of Illinois. 86 But then he added, "that is
where my agreement ends. ' 87 Judge Posner saw an issue raised by the case under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, observing that
"like so much in the Bill of Rights it is a Rorschach test."88 He went on to frame the
constitutional approach, as he envisioned, of how the U.S. Supreme Court would
resolve the case at bar under the Eighth Amendment:
What the judge sees in [the Bill of Rights] is the reflection of his or her own
values, values shaped by personal experience and temperament as well as by
historical reflection, public opinion, and other sources of moral judgment. No
other theory of constitutional interpretation can explain the elaborate edifice of
death-penalty jurisprudence that the Supreme Court has erected in the name of
the Eighth Amendment. Or the interpretation of the amendment as a charter,
however limited, of the rights of prisoners. The limitations imposed by the
amendment might be thought, indeed were thought for more than 150 years after
the amendment was adopted, to end with the sentence, leaving the management
of prisons, the informal "punishment" meted out by brutal guards, constitution-
ally unregulated.89
The above-quoted language of Judge Posner's partial dissenting opinion in
Johnson shows his penchant for what he calls an "impure" style of judicial opinion
that seeks to "'explain[ ] to a hypothetical audience of laypersons why"' he would
Judge Posner wrote two other dissenting opinions-both pure dissents. See United States v. Nagib, 44 F.3d 619,
623-25 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J. dissenting) (objecting to remand for determination of whether the criminal
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in his first appeal). Judge Posner also urged for a remand "with
instructions that the district judge re-examine his ruling on the admission of bad acts evidence...and that, if he
concludes that the evidence should have been excluded [to] grant Nagib a new trial." Id. at 625 (opining that it is
fruitless for the court to engage in conjecture whether or not Nagib's attorney had a strategic reason for his appellate
actions). He stated, "Anything is possible. The moon may be made out of green cheese after all. But the law does
not insist on metaphysical certainty, even when the issue is the imposition of capital punishment on a person who
denies that he is guilty." Id.; see also Scarino v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 47 F.3d 173, 173 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (objecting on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds to
an "Indiana rule which ...places a kind of tax on the practice of law in other states by permitting a lawyer to practice
in Indiana without taking and passing the Indiana bar exam if the lawyer's practice is more than 50 percent 'in
Indiana"').
85. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 153-54 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. Id. at 151.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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decide the case differently from his colleagues in the panel majority.9" Indeed,
Posner's opinion style throughout his Johnson dissent epitomizes this impure style
and contrasts with the "pure" style of judicial opinion writing because it avoids, in
his own words, "the jargon, the solemnity, the high sheen, the impersonality, the
piled-up details conveying an attitude of scrupulous exactness," while also
eschewing "the fondness for truisms, the unembarrassed repetition of obvious
propositions, the long quotations from previous cases," and "the euphemisms, and
exaggerated confidence corresponding to the declamatory mode of 'pure' poetry.
91
The impure style is further illustrated by the next portion of his Johnson dissent,
where he followed up general musings about the open-textured, uncertain quality
of modem constitutional jurisprudence92 with what he calls "the essential
background facts and values on which" he believed "the judgment in this case must
ultimately turn. 93 This was important for Judge Posner because he disagreed with
his Seventh Circuit colleagues that "the Justices have spoken to the issue presented
by this case." 94 Describing his method at this juncture of the dissenting opinion as
"painting in broad strokes, 95 Posner philosophized about the "different ways" one
could choose to "look upon the inmates of prisons and jails in the United States in
1995."96 As he explained, in remarkably haunting and dystopian language:
One way is to look upon them as members of a different species, indeed as a
type of vermin, devoid of human dignity and entitled to no respect; and then no
issue concerning the degrading or brutalizing treatment of prisoners would arise.
In particular there would be no inhibitions about using prisoners as the subject
of experiments, including social experiments such as the experiment of seeing
whether the sexes can be made interchangeable. The parading of naked male
inmates in front of female guards, or of naked female inmates in front of male
guards, would be no more problematic than "cross-sex surveillance" in a
kennel.97
90. Sexy Style, supra note 4, at 663 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They
Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1421 (1995)).
91. Id.
92. Several of Posner's pieces exemplify his academic writings criticizing those that espouse determinate,
grand theories of constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY (1999) [hereinafter PROBLEMATICS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990); and Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998). Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER
& SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS 160 (2002).
[Glrand theory is unnecessary to establish the legitimacy of our ongoing constitutional practices,
which find their ultimate justification in producing a tolerably fair and workable society.
[Moreover,] grand theory is destructive of reasoned decisionmaking by courts. Thus...we agree
with part of Judge Posner's recent argument against grand theory. Like Posner, we think grand
theory is often a dead end. But unlike Posner, we think that taken cautiously and in small doses,
it might have some potential benefits.
Id.
93. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 151 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 152.
96. Id. at 151.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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Rhetorically building on his theme of "us" versus "them" and the dangers that
could flow from such a dichotomy, Judge Posner opined: "I do not myself consider
the 1.5 million inmates of American prisons and jails in that light. This is a non-
negligible fraction of the American population. 98 Furthermore, as Posner pointed
out, raising the emotional intensity of his argument:
And [these figures constitute] only the current inmate population. The fraction
of the total population that has spent time in a prison or jail is larger, although
I do not know how large. A substantial number of these prison and jail inmates,
including the plaintiff in this case, have not been convicted of a crime. They are
merely charged with crime, and awaiting trial. Some of them may actually be
innocent. Of the guilty, many are guilty of sumptuary offenses, or of other
victimless crimes uncannily similar to lawful activity (gambling offenses are an
example), or of esoteric financial and regulatory offenses (such as violation of
migratory game laws) some of which do not even require a guilty intent. It is
wrong to break even foolish laws, or wise laws that should carry only civil
penalties. It is wrongful to break the law even when the lawbreaker is flawed,
weak, retarded, unstable, ignorant, brutalized, or profoundly disadvantaged,
rather than violent, vicious, or evil to the core. But we should have a realistic
conception of the composition of the prison and jail population before deciding
that they are a scum entitled to nothing better than what a vengeful populace and
a resource-starved penal system choose to give them. We must not exaggerate
the distance between "us, "the lawful ones, the respectable ones, and the prison
and jail population; for such exaggeration will make it too easy for us to deny
that population the rudiments of humane consideration.99
Drawing upon the concept of social norms,'0° Posner pointed out that "[t]he
nudity taboo retains great strength in the United States. It should not be confused
with prudery. It is a taboo against being seen in the nude by strangers not by one's
intimates."'' Raising and rejecting the premise that prisoners, like animals, have no
98. Id. In the years since Judge Posner wrote his dissent in Johnson, the number of prison and jail inmates
has substantially increased to about 2.2 million individuals. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 204
(William A. McGeveran et al. eds., 2006). A more nuanced breakdown of this statistic is as follows:
As of June 30, 2004, there were 1,494,216 prisoners under the jurisdiction of federal or state
adult correctional authorities. The total prison population grew 2.3% which was less than the
average annual growth of 3.5% since 1995. As of mid-2004, these two systems housed 2/3 of
the incarcerated population. Jails, which are locally operated and typically hold persons awaiting
trial and those with sentences of a year or less, held most of the remainder (713,990); not
including those held in community-based programs.
As of June 30, 2004, the rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons for sentences of
more than one year was 486 per 100,000 U.S. residents, up from 411 at year-end 1995.
Id.
99. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 151-52 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
100. In recent years, there has been an explosion of academic writing on social norms and the law. See, e.g.,
ERIc POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRms (2000).
101. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 152 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Qualifying his general
observation about the American nudity taboo with more nuance, Posner went on in his dissent to informally
contend:
Ours is a morally diverse populace and the nudity taboo is not of uniform strength across it. It
is strongest among professing Christians, because of the historical antipathy of the Church to
nudity; and as it happens the plaintiff alleges that his right "to practice Ch[rlistian modesty is
being violated." The taboo is particularly strong when the stranger belongs to the opposite sex.
There are radical feminists who regard "sex" as a social construction and the very concept of
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rights,'02 Posner staked out the logical claim that it is "the duty of a society that
would like to think of itself as civilized to treat its prisoners humanely."' 3 In
addition, Posner sarcastically concluded his general observations about nudity and
American social norms by quipping, "I think that the interest of a prisoner in being
free from unnecessary cross-sex surveillance has priority over the unisex-bathroom
movement and requires us to reverse the judgment of the district court throwing out
this lawsuit. ' 4
After laying the above-described philosophical foundation, Judge Posner's
Johnson dissenting opinion took up "the particulars of this case and the state of the
precedents."' 5 He started with the starkly worded pro se complaint of "Albert
Johnson, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Jail," who complained that "female
guards were allowed to watch his naked body while he showered and used the
toilet."" Then, he articulated the issues that governed the dispute: "[T]he main issue
raised by this appeal is whether a prisoner has an interest that the Constitution
protects in hiding his naked body from guards of the opposite sex. ' 07 Moreover,
according to Posner, "[a] subordinate issue is whether.. .the complaint.. .sufficiently
alleges deliberate as distinct from merely accidental exposure to survive
dismissal,' 0° to meet the standard of a section 1983 cause of action.
Moving from the factual particulars to the general structure of constitutional
protections implicated by the prisoner's complaint, Posner contended that viewing
the case as a species of the right to privacy or the right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures was "too tortuous and uncertain a route to follow in the quest
for constitutional limitations on the infliction of humiliation on prison inmates. ' 9
Rather, for him, the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,
applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
was a more straightforward and practical lens through which to examine Johnson's
complaint."° Since Judge Posner assumed that the caselaw of the various circuit
courts of appeal recognizes "that purely psychological punishments can sometimes
be deemed cruel and unusual,"'' the core of the appeal was the following refined
issue: "[W]hether exposing naked prisoners to guards of the opposite sex can ever
be deemed one of these cruel and unusual psychological punishments."
'
"
12
"the opposite sex," implying as it does the dichotomization of the "sexes" (the "genders," as we
are being taught to say), as a sign of patriarchy. For these feminists the surveillance of naked
male prisoners by female guards and naked female prisoners by male guards are way stations on
the road to sexual equality.
Id.
Interestingly, a few years before the Johnson case was decided, Judge Posner authored an entire book on human
sexuality and the law. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) [hereinafter SEx AND REASON].
102. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 152 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 152-53.
110. Id. at 153.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Responding to the main point in the reasoning of the majority opinion (that equal
employment opportunities of female guards and efficient prison administration lead
to the conclusion that there is no Eighth Amendment violation), ' 3 Posner disagreed
by dint of forceful logic and searing hypothetical example, stating:
I have no patience with the suggestion that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 forbids a prison or jail to impede, however slightly, the...opportunities of
female guards by shielding naked prisoners from their eyes. It is true that since
the male prison population is vastly greater than the female, female guards
would gain no corresponding advantage from being allowed to monopolize the
surveillance of naked female prisoners. But Title VII cannot override the
Constitution. There cannot be a right to inflict cruel and unusual punishments in
order to secure a merely statutory entitlement to equal opportunities for women
in the field of corrections .... Just as it would not be a defense to a charge that the
rack and thumbscrew are forms of cruel and unusual punishment to demonstrate
that they are cheaper than imprisonment, so it is not a defense to the infliction
of cruel and unusual psychological punishments that they advance women's
career opportunities." 4
Judge Posner followed up this portion of his dissenting opinion in Johnson by a
dexterous distinguishing of the principal Supreme Court precedent against his
argument, Bell v. Wolfsh-a case that held, in his rendition, "that pretrial detainees
may be subjected to digital and visual inspection of the rectum for concealed
weapons or other contraband.""'  Posner pointed out, however, that "[i]t does not
follow that no constitutional issue is raised if the search is performed by a male
guard on a female prisoner, or a female guard on a male prisoner. ' 16 Posner thought
that pragmatism, not what he considered the hyperbole of the majority decision, was
needed to wisely decide the case. First, he urged that a realization that a somewhat
open-textured constitutional test was advisable ("the Eighth Amendment requires
in my view that reasonable efforts be made to prevent frequent, deliberate,
113. Id. at 147-48 (majority opinion). As eloquently stated by the author of the majority opinion, Judge Frank
Easterbrook:
[C]ross-sex monitoring reduces the need for prisons to make sex a criterion of employment, and
therefore reduces the potential for conflict with Title VII and the equal protection clause. Cells
and showers are designed so that guards can see in, to prevent violence and other offenses.
Prisoners dress, undress, and bathe under watchful eyes. Guards roaming the corridors are bound
to see naked prisoners. A prison could comply with the rule Johnson proposes, and still maintain
surveillance, only by relegating women to the administrative wing, limiting their duties (thereby
raising the cost of the guard complement), or eliminating them from the staff.
To the riposte that Title VII and the equal protection clause can't authorize a violation of the
eighth amendment, we rejoin: True enough, but not pertinent. A warden must accommodate
conflicting interests-the embarrassment of reticent prisoners, the entitlement of women to equal
treatment in the workplace. A state may reject the prisoner's claim if it has a reason....The
interest of women in equal treatment is a solid reason, with more secure footing in American law
than prisoners' modesty, leading to the conclusion that there is no violation of the eighth
amendment... When interests clash, ajudge must prefer those based on legislative decisions over
those that reflect their own views of sound policy.
Id.
114. Id. at 153-54 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 154 (discussing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979)).
116. Id. at 154-55.
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gratuitous exposure of nude prisoners of one sex to guards of the other sex")." 17
Second, he advocated for an appreciation of the "reality.. .that crime is gendered,
and the gender is male."' 18 Third, he argued for a clear distinction between motive
and intent such that the relevant constitutional touchstone was not whether the
motive "of the prison officials are in some sense punitive" to give rise to liability
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, "9 but rather, whether the prison
officials had the requisite intent of "deliberate indifference" because "[i]f prison
officials know that they are subjecting male prisoners to gratuitous humiliation, the
infliction is deliberate, even if the officials are not actuated by any punitive purpose
and are not even certain that humiliation will result."'' 20 Finally, Judge Posner
suggested the need for a sympathetic attitude by the judiciary to a pro se prisoner
who contends that he is being treated in a fashion akin to "barbarism"' 2' and was not
given the opportunity to develop the specific facts of his predicament at trial.'
E. An Expostulation for Deciding Whether a Heightened Standard of Proof Is
Required at a Sentencing Hearing
In 1996, Judge Posner wrote a relatively rare dissent from a denial of a hearing
en banc in United States v. Rodriguez. 23 Anticipating the view that would be taken
117. Id. at 155.
118. Id. (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L REv. 2151
(1995)). Posner particularized this assertion by stating, "The vast majority of criminals are male. The vast majority
of their victims are male. These are inescapable realities in the design of penal institutions and the validation of
penal practices." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Judge Posner supported his analysis of the distinction between motive and intent with three more
colorful hypotheticals. The first hypothetical was: "If prison officials use the thumbscrew and rack to discipline
unruly prisoners, it is immaterial that their motive is not to punish but merely to maintain good order in the prison,
or to save money." Id. His second hypothetical was: "The public beheadings of murderers by Saudi Arabia are, I
imagine, motivated not by sadism but rather (to the extent that they have any secular motivation) by a belief that
the public infliction of cruel and unusual punishments minimizes the crime rate," thus "[i]f prison officials
deliberately expose male prisoners to the gaze of female guards, or female prisoners to the gaze of male guards, it
should be irrelevant that the motive of the officials may have been merely to avoid sorting custodial tasks by
gender." Id. The third Posnerian hypothetical to illustrate the point in the text was: "If someone plants a bomb in
an airplane, his intent in the eyes of the law is to kill, though his motive might be to intimidate political opponents,
obtain publicity, demonstrate skill with explosives, collect life insurance on a passenger, or distract the police from
his other criminal activities." id.
121. Id. at 156.
122. Id. Judge Posner ended his dissent by writing:
My colleagues say that we must respect "the hard choices made by prison administrators." I
agree. There is no basis in the record, however, for supposing that such a choice was made here,
or for believing that an effort to limit cross-sex surveillance would involve an inefficient use of
staff-"featherbedding," as my colleagues put it. There is no record. The case was dismissed on
the complaint. We do not know whether the Cook County Jail cannot...feasibly confine the
surveillance of naked male prisoners to male guards and naked female prisoners to female
guards. We do not even know what crime Johnson is charged with. My colleagues urge
deference to the prison administrators, but at the same time speak confidently about the costs of
redeploying staff to protect Johnson's rights. It would be nice to know a little more about the
facts before making a judgment that condones barbarism.
Id. (emphasis added).
123. 73 F.3d 161, 162 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). In 1996,
Posner authored one additional dissenting opinion. See Am. Int'l Adjustment Co. v. Galvin, 86 F.3d 1455, 1462
(7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (ranting about the performance of a trucking company's trial defense
counsel who, in Posner's view, blew the case for his client in a diversity jurisdiction legal malpractice action). See
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by the U.S. Supreme Court a few years later, 124 Posner pithily summarized the
question on which rehearing en banc was sought: "[W]hether a heightened standard
of proof, either clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is required in a case in which the real trial occurs at the sentencing hearing rather
than at the trial of guilt. '1
25
The problem in Rodriguez was that, after the guilt phase where "the prosecutor
invited the jury to convict on the basis of evidence that the defendant had" sold ten
ounces of marijuana, the sentencing judge "found by a [mere] preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant had actually sold more than 1,000 kilograms of
marijuana."' 126 Thus, this high volume contraband sentencing finding, coupled with
Rodriguez's criminal record, triggered a mandatory federal sentence of life
imprisonment. 27 With perfect pitch, situating the occasion for appellate review
midway between the pathos of sending a human being to prison for life for the sale
of ten ounces of marijuana and the logic of insisting upon constitutionally-
mandated, evidentiary standards of proof, Judge Posner powerfully conveyed the
real world momentousness of the prisoner's appeal:
The extraordinary severity of the punishment prescribed by Congress for sellers
of marijuana, and Congress's increasing tendency to specify mandatory
minimum terms, thereby curtailing the sentencing discretion of judges and the
Sentencing Commission, are controversial. But I accept absolutely the power of
Congress to adopt these policies and I have no desire to attempt an end run
around them. Yet even if their legitimacy, if not necessarily their wisdom, is
wholeheartedly accepted, as I think it my duty as ajudge to do, there is a serious
question whether it is permissible to sentence a person to life in prison, without
possibility of parole, at the end of a brief and casual sentencing hearing in
which.. .the rules of evidence are not enforced, in which the standard of proof
is no higher than in an ordinary civil case, and in which the judge's decision will
make the difference between a light punishment and a punishment that is the
maximum that our system allows short of death. 21
Raising the specter that little things can make a big difference, 129 Posner pointed
out that "[h]ad the defendant been sentenced on the basis of a sale of 10 ounces of
marijuana, his sentence might have been as short as 18 months.' 130 His dissent went
on to articulate plausible arguments for requiring a "heightened standard" of proof
at a sentencing hearing before a federal judge, predicated on potential procedural
due process concerns. ' 3' Brilliantly, however, Posner claimed that "[tihere is an even
better argument" that an enhanced standard of proof at sentencing hearings "should
infra notes 134-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of Posner's American International Adjustment Co.
dissent.
124. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
125. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d at 162 (Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 162-63 (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)).
128. Id. at 162.
129. See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LIrLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2002).
130. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161, 162 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
131. Id. at 163.
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be required in such cases simply as an intelligent rule of the federal common law of
criminal procedure, without reference to the Constitution," since the burden of proof
at a sentencing hearing has not been specified by Congress and, therefore, is "left
to the federal courts to resolve."'
3 2
With characteristic caution and measured respect for the law-interpreting process
of en banc appellate review, Judge Posner ended this succinct dissenting opinion
with an eloquent call for full court review, opining:
I do not go so far as to say that I would vote to adopt the higher standard of
proof if rehearing en banc was granted. That is a difficult question, in part
because of the difficulty of defining the scope of such a rule. I say only that the
question is sufficiently important, the stakes in personal liberty sufficiently great,
that the full court should examine it. We are not overburdened with en banc
proceedings, and I cannot think of a more suitable issue on which to expend
some of the resources that we are able to devote to such proceedings.'33
F. A Rambling Rant Against Attorney Malpractice
Why did Judge Posner go to the time and trouble to write a rambling dissent from
a panel decision that granted a new legal malpractice trial to an Indiana defense
lawyer, Mr. Galvin, who was adjudicated below as being professionally negligent
for losing a personal injury action brought by the estate of a woman driver, Mrs.
Dickinson, who died a month after she suffered injuries in a negligently-caused
truck accident? In the diversity case of American International Adjustment Co. v.
Galvin, Posner disagreed with his panel colleagues, who interpreted the Indiana
standard of professional practice as not requiring, as a matter of law, that the defense
attorney determine the cause of the driver's death in order to procedurally knock
out, prior to trial, the plaintiff's survivor action (which otherwise would allow full
damages, including pain and suffering, from the time of the injuries sustained in the
vehicular accident until her death).' Posner certainly had a valid point in his
dissent: defense counsel, Mr. Galvin, was sloppy since he "had only to establish that
the tort had been the cause of Mrs. Dickinson's death and his client would have little
reason to fear a large verdict,"'35 and the case would be governed by Indiana's
wrongful death statute, which limited recovery to the "victim's medical and funeral
expenses plus any pecuniary or other loss incurred by the victim's survivors. '' '36
According to Posner, "Galvin knew this, but for unfathomable reasons decided
against serving interrogatories or requests for admissions on his adversary, deposing
the doctors who attended Mrs. Dickinson in the hospital, or otherwise establishing
the cause of death and then moving for summary judgment on the survival claim.' 137
Galvin's mistake led to the introduction of a videotape at trial, which depicted the
horrific suffering of Mrs. Dickinson on the day she died in her hospital bed from a
pulmonary embolism. In addition, Galvin compounded his client's potential
132. Id.
133. Id. at 164.
134. 86 F.3d 1455, 1462 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1463.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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exposure for damages because he did not seek "to instruct the jury not to consider
the videotape and the other evidence bearing on Mrs. Dickinson's pain and
suffering"1 38 after he won a partial directed verdict excluding the survivor claim.
The style of Judge Posner's dissenting opinion here is not characterized by
practical reason, but, rather, by a hyper-technical scholasticism and mean-
spiritedness. He went out of his way to personally embarrass Mr. Galvin and the
former Indiana state judge who provided an expert opinion of the legal standard of
care for a defense attorney in a personal injury action governed by Indiana law.
Unfortunately, Judge Posner' s dissent in American International Adjustment Co. is
reminiscent of his unattractive tendency, occasionally manifested during his first
decade as a federal appellate court judge, to engage in "overly-aggressive personal
attacks" in the course of his dissenting opinions.'39
G. An Argument for Judicial Creativity in Applying Title VII to Sexual
Harassment by Supervisory Employees
In one of his finest dissenting performances during his entire judicial career, in
1997 Judge Posner wrote a partial concurring and dissenting opinion in Jansen v.
Packaging Corp. of America,'40 a consolidated case that, in Posner's view,
"present[ed] ...difficult and important questions concerning the application of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to sexual harassment by supervisory
employees."' 4' At the outset of his partial dissent, Posner indicated his agreement
"with the basic approach"'4 of the plurality en banc concurring opinion prepared by
Circuit Judge Flaum. 143 Framing the general tenor of his disagreement with the
Seventh Circuit plurality, the first paragraph of Judge Posner's opinion succinctly
explained:
Our most substantial difference concerns the employer's liability, in "quid pro
quo" sexual harassment cases, for what I shall call "noncompany acts"; these are
illustrated by a supervisor's threat that is not followed up by termination,
demotion, or other acts that change the contractual relation between the
victimized employee and the employer.'"
In the gentle, probing, scholarly analysis that follows Posner's opening, he
seemed to be thinking out loud about the nature of sexual harassment by supervisory
corporate employees in America, the sources of law available to the federal judiciary
in resolving these disputes, and the common sense repercussions of judicially
choosing one approach over another. 4 5 Starting his dissenting brainstorm, Posner
complained that too many lawyers misinterpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's
138. id. at 1464.
139. See Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 156-57.
140. 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (reh'g en banc) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The named case was consolidated with Eflerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc. During 1997 Judge Posner wrote no
other dissenting opinions.
141. Id. at 506.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 495 (Flaum, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 506 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 506-08.
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observation in a 1986 case that "'Congress wanted courts to look to agency
principles ' ' 14 6 in interpreting Title VII actions for "sexual harassment of one
employee by another" 147 as a ruling that "Title VII incorporates the American Law
Institute's Restatement of Agency."'148 As he explained later in his statutory assay,
the American Law Institute's forty-year array of black letter agency rules is a
"petrified text"' 49 that was "designed mainly for two types of case neither of which"
was before the court. 50 Yet, "[s]ince neither the text nor the legislative history of
Title VII indicates what agency principles the authors of the statute had in mind, the
formalist gropes for another text, finds the Restatement, and treats it inappropriately
as a surrogate statute.'' 1 As Posner cogently pointed out, however, adding a touch
of righteous indignation:
[H]ad the Supreme Court told us to use the Second Restatement ofAgency as the
framework for evaluating sexual harassment under Title VII, I would bow to its
command. It did not; but by citing the Restatement it gave lawyers and judges
a straw to grasp at. The straw has broken in their hand. The Restatement turns
out to be hopelessly vague in its bearing on the issue of employers' liability for
sexual harassment, being vaguely worded and addressed to other issues.. .Thejudges and lawyers who insist that the Restatement ofAgency is The Way either
are disingenuous, wishing to conceal their true grounds of decision, or are in the
grip of the formalist belief that difficult cases can be decided by teasing out the
meaning of words in a text composed with other problems in mind, without need
to examine the social policies that the law might be thought to be serving. '52
Judge Posner, in search of sound agency principles to apply to the "statutory tort
of employment discrimination" created by Title VII,' 53 concluded that it would be
unwise to borrow "agency law of the state where the dispute arose"' 154 since this
"could introduce striking geographical disuniformities and indeed would empower
a state to nullify Title VII."' 55 Continuing his quest, Posner astutely observed that
"[j]ust as I do not think that Title Vi's silence with respect to the applicable agency
principles points us toward the incorporation of state law, so I do not think that its
silence can tell us anything about the structure of those principles.' 56 Suggesting,
by subtle implication, the advisability of nuanced agency principles of employer
146. Id. at 506 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 508.
150. Id. "The first is the tort committed against a stranger, as where a truck driver employed by the defendant
runs down a pedestrian. The second is the contract between a stranger and an agent of the defendant." Id. Posner
noted: "[Tihe Second Restatement ofAgency (there is no third) was promulgated 40 years ago, before Title VII was
enacted and before the concept of sexual harassment had emerged as a distinct legal concept." Id.
151. Id. at510.
152. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). Posner followed up this observation with the following scholarly quotation:
"'We condemn Lochner as formalistic not because it involves a choice, but because it attempts to describe this
choice as compulsion."' Id. at 509-10 (quoting Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511-12 (1988)).
153. Id. at 506.
154. Id. at 507.
155. Id. Posner went on to opine: "Deciding what agency principles shall govern liability under a liability-
creating statute such as Title VH is not free-wheeling common-law rulemaking; it is filling a statutory gap, a
standard office of interpretation." Id.
156. Id. at 508.
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liability for sexual harassment by employees against other employees, Posner
claimed that Title VII's silence regarding relevant agency principles
cannot tell us whether... the employer should be strictly liable for all acts of
sexual harassment on or off the premises.. .by all employees, or whether
distinctions should be made on the basis of kinds of employee (such as
supervisory or nonsupervisory) or kinds of act (such as demotion versus a sexual
solicitation versus forcible rape), or some combination of the two.'57
In what is the brilliant core of his dissent, Judge Posner asserted that the Supreme
Court had invited lower federal courts to fashion "what the best regime of liability
would be for" sexual harassment cases. 5 8 Echoing insights of legal process
jurisprudence, Posner asserted: "It would be misleading even to speak of applying
to this case 'the law of agency.' That would imply the existence of some ready-at-
hand body of rules that we have only to apply to a new set of circumstances. The
problem is not application; it is creation."'59
Grabbing the bull by the horns, Posner engaged in judicial policy analysis of
prioritizing the most sensible tort law policies'6° to deal with the problem of
employer liability for employee sexual harassment under Title VII. He found it
appropriate to give primacy to the tort policy of deterrence over the policy of
compensation because of his concerns with what he perceived to be an over-
regulation of American labor markets. 16' Yet, as he explained, compensation of
sexual harassment victims by employer Title VII liability in the appropriate case is
a worthy secondary policy for legal doctrine to express:
We.. .cannot avoid the task of trying to create a set of agency principles that will
deter sexual harassment without imposing an unreasonable burden on employers.
I do not consider the burden of liability on employers a negligible consideration
in formulating federal common law rules to govern aspects of employment
regulation. Our labor markets are becoming choked by regulation, all well
meaning but cumulatively an impediment to the efficient employment of the
nation's most valuable economic resource, which is its workers.
I emphasize deterring sexual harassment rather than compensating its victims
because, unlike many torts-and again the clearest illustrations are torts that
inflict physical injury-sexual harassment does not usually bring about a
significant change in the victim's wealth. The victim may be humiliated and
deeply distressed by it; rarely will she (or the very occasional he) be
impoverished by it. This is not to say that psychological pain should not figure
in the calculation of damages. It should. All I wish to emphasize is that an award
of damages in these cases is not primarily designed to protect the victim's
standard of living. The payment of damages in the usual case of sexual
157. Id.
158. Id. at 510.
159. Id. (emphasis added); see also HART& SACKS, supra note 57. The subtitle of this classic in legal process
jurisprudence is "Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law."
160. There are at least a dozen key policy considerations that drive twenty-first century tort law. See generally
Robert F. Blomquist, Re-Enchanting Torts, 56 S.C. LAw REv. 481, 497-98 (2005) (discussing policies of
compensation, deterrence, administrative efficiency, avoiding intractable inquiries, loss spreading, and liability
proportionality to fault as key tort policy drivers).
161. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 510 (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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harassment is an instrument for deterring future incidents of such harassment
rather than for restoring lost earnings or for financing expensive curative or
rehabilitative measures. 62
According to Posner, given the primary goal of deterrence of employment-related
sexual harassment by employers, the usual standard of care for supervisor
harassment should be negligence rather than strict liability-the same standard
adopted by many federal courts of appeal to address hostile environment sexual
discrimination by an employee's non-supervisory workers. 163 The rationale for the
less onerous negligence standard is that "[a] law that requires the employer to do
more than is feasible to control harassment will impose costs without creating
deterrent benefits."' 64 Moreover, as Posner opined, "In these circumstances, strict
liability would not only be expensive and unnecessary, and possibly regressive as
well; it would be futile."'165 Adding new insights to the nature of employer liability
for sexual harassment of an employee by "a supervisor rather than a line employee,"
Judge Posner distinguished in his analysis "between two types of sexual harassment
by supervisors."' 66 Thus:
In the first type, the supervisor uses or attempts to use his supervisory authority
to obtain sexual favors from an employee. This is the domain of what has come
to be called "quid pro quo" harassment. In the second type of case, the
supervisor does not use or attempt to use his supervisory authority at all. He
harasses an employee, but he does so in exactly the same way that an employee
who had no supervisory authority would harass another employee. He uses
unwanted terms of endearment; he fondles or rubs up against his victim; he
displays sex toys or tells dirty jokes; he brags about his sexual skills; he
proposes marriage; he threatens to kill himself; in the extreme case.. .he rapes
her. 167
Regarding the second type of supervisor sexual harassment, hostile environment
harassment, Posner claimed that "[t]he proper standard of employer liability here is
162. Id
163. Id.
164. Id. at 511. As Posner explained, weaving a web of likely economic consequences if a strict liability
standard is adopted by the court:
In the long run, these costs will be borne largely by consumers, in the form of higher prices for
the employer's product, and workers, in the form of lower wages (because the higher costs are
labor costs). Many consumers and workers are women, so women, who are the principal victims
of sexual harassment, will pay a big part of the costs that employers incur as a consequence of
excessively harsh principles of employers' liability.
Id.
165. Id. Continuing with impeccable economic logic, Posner argued:
If the law imposes liability in harassment cases in which there is no reasonable measure that the
employer could have taken to prevent the harassment, the only effect of the law will be to impose
extra costs on employers and those with whom they are linked contractually. Employers will
prefer paying the occasional judgment to incurring costs that, by definition, exceed the
employer's foreseeable liability-by definition because, were the costs less than the expected
liability, the failure to incur them would be negligence; it is only when they are greater, so that
the employer would not be negligent for failing to incur them, that strict liability bites.
Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 511-12 (citation omitted).
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negligence, just as in the case of harassment by nonsupervisory employees, because
it is as costly to the employer to police this kind of harassment by a supervisor as it
is to police the identical harassment by a coworker."' 168 Posner admited that, given
the intimidating reality of a supervisor's authority over a potential victim of sexual
harassment, "due care on the part of employers to prevent [hostile environment]
sexual harassment by its supervisory employees may require the creation of
additional complaint machinery when the complaint is against a supervisor.' ' 169 He
argued that the negligence standard should be the standby standard in that type of
case, ending his discussion with the wry observation that "[e]xcessive complexity
is the bane of American law; we have an opportunity to make it a little simpler."' 7°
Regarding the first type of supervisor sexual harassment, quid pro quo
harassment, Posner divided this type into two categories: (1) a case when "the
supervisor brings about a significant alteration in the terms or conditions of his
victim's employment,"'' 7 1 what Posner later in the opinion called a "company act,"'
172
and (2) "when the supervisor merely makes threats"'173 to alter the terms and
conditions of employment of the victim, "even if the threats are effective" in causing
the victim to submit to the supervisor's sexual advances-so-called noncompany
acts. 174 As to a supervisor's sexual harassment culminating in a company act, Posner
believed that a strict liability standard for the employer was suitable.' 75 Conversely,
as to a supervisor's sexual harassment culminating in a noncompany act, Posner
believed that negligence was the proper standard for employer liability.' 76 To aid
understanding of his approach, Posner provided a table 77 as follows:
LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH
By Supervisor By Coworker
"Company act" Employer strictly liable N.A.
"NONCOMPANY ACT" Employer liable only if Employer liable only if
negligent negligent
168. Id. at 512.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 512-13.
173. Id. at 513.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 512.
176. Id. at 513.
177. Id. at 515. Posner stated, in explaining his table:
The term "company act" signifies an act that significantly alters the terms or conditions of
employment of the victim of sexual harassment and "noncompany act" signifies hostile-
environment harassment by coworkers or supervisors or the kind of quid pro quo harassment that
involves only unfulfilled threats (either because the victim submits or because she calls the
supervisor's bluff), so that no company act is committed. The difficult borderline case is that of
constructive termination precipitated by a threat. The termination will look to the supervisor's
superiors like a voluntary quit. But since there is always some paperwork involved in an
employee's quitting, the higher-ups in the company will have some ability to monitor
constructive discharges, and I would therefore impose strict liability in such cases.
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In the final portion of his partial dissenting opinion, Judge Posner applied his
suggested analysis to the facts in the consolidated cases before the court.
H. An Equable Proposal for Protecting Privacy Interests in Garbage
In 1998, in United States v. Redmon,178 Judge Posner penned a fascinating, level-
headed essay, 179 dissenting from the en banc majority opinion that had, among other
things, affirmed the police tactic of warrantless searches of a criminal defendant's
garbage cans "while the cans were sitting just outside his garage" on a common
driveway. 80 The searches led to evidence of cocaine trafficking and conviction for
federal drug and career offender violations.18 ' At the start of his dissenting opinion,
Posner provided a thumbnail sketch of the relevant facts, issue, and holding,
suggesting that the majority's approach would lead to greater administrative
complexity without offsetting practical benefits:
The defendant lived in a house with an attached garage that was at the end of a
driveway 28 feet from the public street. He kept his garbage cans in the garage,
but when a garbage pickup was due he would take them out of the garage...rather
than, as would be more common but also unsightly and forbidden by a local
ordinance, at the curb of the public street. Presumably ...the garbage collectors
would walk up his driveway, carry the cans to the street, empty them into their
truck, and return the cans to their place in front of the garage. The question
raised by Redmon's appeal is whether the police could, consistently with the
Fourth Amendment, walk up the driveway and search the cans, without a
warrant or probable cause, while the cans were up against the garage awaiting
the garbage collectors. The odd thing about the answer given by the majority
opinion-"yes"-is that it will complicate the administration of the law without
conferring any practical benefit on law enforcers. The better answer would be
that searches, including searches of garbage, that take place within the curtilage
of the defendant's property must comply with the Fourth Amendment's
restrictions on searches. The search here took place within the defendant's
curtilage, and so his conviction should be reversed.8 2
After this overview, Judge Posner launched a gentle, exploratory investigation of
the constitutional status of a person's garbage. Initially, he observed that while "[it
is tempting to suppose that the search of a garbage can could never violate [the
Fourth Amendment right] because the act of discarding something as trash or
garbage is a relinquishment of any interest in it,' 83 such interpretation "must be
178. 138 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
179. Id. at 1128 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
180. Id at 1111 (majority opinion).
181. Id. at 1110. During 1998 Judge Posner penned two other dissenting opinions: United States v. Wilson,
159 F.3d 280, 293 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that the criminal
defendant who was convicted of the federal offense of possessing a gun in interstate commerce while subject to a
domestic relations protective order should have his conviction voided because he had no reason to believe that the
act for which he was convicted was wrongful), and Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 679-80 (7th Cir.
1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the court should, in a Title IX case,
exercise its plenary jurisdiction to craft a standard of liability for public educational institutions for hostile
environment sexual harassment by other students).
182. Redmon, 138 F.3d at 1128-29 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1129.
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wrong" since "it would entitle the police to enter the home itself and rifle the trash
cans and wastepaper baskets found there, supposing they could do this without
committing a breach of the peace (as they could by pretending to be servicemen of
one sort or another)."' 84 Posner followed up this cloak-and-dagger imagery by
pointing out that "it is equally well established in the case law that once the garbage
is taken away by the garbage collectors, the (former) owner of the garbage has no
right to complain" if the police comb through the refuse "without bothering to get
a warrant or otherwise demonstrating the reasonableness of the search" and "find
contraband or evidence of crime to use against him."' 85 For Posner, resolution of the
constitutional puzzle in Redmon came down to the proper way of looking at the
police behavior-whether it should be viewed as a mere "petty trespass,"'8 6
involving no exclusion of the fruit of the poisonous tree, or whether it, rather, should
be viewed as a serious, "menacing" trespass'87 of the defendant's property rights,
thereby necessitating exclusion of the ill-gotten evidence and the follow-up evidence
obtained by search warrant. According to his pellucid, colloquial analysis:
It is tempting to view the present case [as a petty trespass]. Although the garbage
cans were not adjacent to the curb, they were awaiting pickup, and it might not
seem to make much difference whether the police sneak up the driveway and
search the garbage there or wait until it has been taken to the garbage truck at
curbside. (I am assuming the garbage truck does not drive into the driveway for
the pickup, though as I have already noted there is nothing in the record about
the details of the garbage collection). Both are trespasses. But reaching a few
inches over someone's property line is a petty trespass...while marching up his
driveway to rummage through the garbage cans placed at the head of the
driveway is not. It is true that the garbagemen had permission to march up to the
garage to get the cans, just as there is an implicit permission for friends, service
people, and many others to march up to one's front door....But one's right to
complain about a trespass does not depend on one's refusing to invite anyone
onto any part of his property, for then only hermits (and not all of them) would
have property rights.8"
Grounding his suggested resolution of the case on the common law doctrine of
curtilage,' 89 Posner pointed out that this doctrine should be interpreted in light of
privacy interests because "ever since the invention of wiretapping, which is a
nontrespassory invasion of home or office, emphasis in the interpretation and
application of the Fourth Amendment has shifted from the protection of property to
the protection of privacy."' 9 Making the distinction between privacy and secrecy,
Posner used the trope of a prying archaeologist who is obsessed with sorting through
a person's garbage' 9' to clarify his contention that privacy (what the Fourth
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1130.
188. Id. at 1129-30 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
189. "Curtilage" is defined as "the area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically."
Id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Id.
191. Cf WILLIAM RATHIE & CULLEN MURPHY, RUBBISH! THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GARBAGE (2001)
[Vol. 36
POSNER'S DISSENTING JUDICIAL OEUVRE
Amendment protects) is broader and more elastic than secrecy. Posner explained,
in language evocative of a Patricia Highsmith short story,'9 2 that
[a] garbage can is not a secure repository of secrets, though this is not because,
as remarked in the majority opinion, raccoons can get at garbage; raccoons are
not interested in human beings' secrets. Garbage cans are insecure because once
the garbage leaves your property you can't physically prevent anyone from
going into it and piecing together the letters that you tore up and threw away and
reconstructing your balance sheet from your discarded check stubs, and your diet
and drinking habits from refuse and empty bottles, and, if the snoop is a skilled
archaeologist, perhaps obtaining over a period of months a detailed picture of
your intimate and maybe disreputable private life.
So there are no secrets in garbage. But it doesn't follow that garbage isn't
private. Most people don't think about the possibility of serious snooping in their
garbage, or can't afford paper shredders and trash compactors.. .and burn boxes
and private landfills that would be necessary, though not necessarily
sufficient...to eliminate all occasions for extruding readable trash and revelatory
garbage from home or office. It doesn't follow that one would be unreasonable
to be horrified to discover that the archaeologist had been at work reconstructing
your life from your garbage and was about to publish a detailed profile of your
private life, including your sex life. The tort law of privacy would provide you
with a remedy against such a publication....I assume that copyright law would
provide you with a remedy if one of the things that the archaeologist found and
wanted to publish was the discarded first draft of your unpublished novel, as the
act of discarding would not be an abandonment of the copyright....I conclude
from these examples that there are legally protected interests in garbage even
after it leaves one's property, and I do not see why they should not be interests
that the Fourth Amendment protects, once its scope is acknowledged to reach
beyond property to privacy.'93
Discerning no law enforcement imperative for conducting garbage-within-
curtilage cases,194 concerned about the repercussions of allowing police to search a
garbage can on someone's property, 195 and mindful of police uncertainty concerning
where the judiciary would eventually draw the constitutional line in similar cases,"9
Judge Posner ended his dissent by proposing "drawing the line at the curtilage."'97
(documenting the "Garbage Project," a study on garbage at the University of Arizona).
192. See generally ANDREW WILSON, BEAUTIFUL SHADOW: THE LIFE OF PATRICIA HIGHsMrrH (2003)
(describing the chilling and highly original "outsider" fiction of Highsmith).
193. Redmon, 138 F.3d at 1131 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 1132.
195. Id at 1131.
Otherwise [without a curtilage rule), whenever the police spot a garbage can on someone's
property they will have at least a colorable case for being allowed to go on the property and
search it even though it might turn out not to contain garbage, since garbage cans are not
infrequently used for other purposes. And once they reach it, they can of course glance around
and if they see contraband or illegal activity through a window of the house and don't have time
to get a warrant, they can enter the house and search and arrest.
Id.
196. ld. at 1132.
197. Id.
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I. A Conscientious Suggestion That an Exculpatory Witness Statement Should
Not Have Been Excluded
During 1999, in United States v. Amerson, 198 Judge Posner authored a succinct,
compelling dissent from the majority opinion of his panel colleagues in a criminal
case where the trial court refused to allow the defendant's proffer of an
uncorroborated, third-party affidavit that would have, if believed by the jury,
exculpated Amerson from conviction for possessing a quarter of an ounce of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute.' Reflecting a pattern of dissent employed during
his more mature years as a federal appellate judge-championing the underdog in
several of his dissenting opinions2 u-- Posner commenced his dissent in Amerson in
a temperate, respectful manner, noting:
Amerson was convicted of unlawful possession of a quarter of an ounce of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute it and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
Given the length of the sentence, we should review the rulings of the district
judge with more than the usual care to make sure that an innocent man has not
been convicted. I do not doubt that my colleagues have tried conscientiously to
do this, but I am not persuaded that the conviction can stand.2"'
In taut, suspenseful, narrative prose, Posner went on in the second paragraph of
his dissent to summarize the facts:
The Peoria police raided a second-floor apartment that they suspected was a
crack house. In one room they found Timothy Heard, who as they entered broke
a window with his fist. The police testified that they found a small container of
crack on the floor of the room. They waited in the apartment and several
customers for crack showed up, one of whom was arrested. Night fell. There was
a knock at the front door. It was Robert Amerson. A voice within called, "Who
is it?" and Amerson answered, "It's Rob. Open the door." One of the crack
dealers who was being detained in the house by the police shouted, "Rob, it's the
police." Immediately the police yanked the door open and as they did
so-according to the testimony of the three officers who were in the front room
of the apartment-Amerson tossed a plastic bag over his shoulder. The police
testified that they found the bag, containing small "rocks" of crack cocaine, on
the ground in front of the building but that they found nothing but shards of glass
198. 185 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1999).
199. Id. at 690 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). During 1999 Judge Posner authored four other pure dissenting
opinions. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 876 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
state's partial-birth abortion statutes at bar were both unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and that the majority's
use of limited precautionary injunctions was an invalid "gimmick"); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 905
(7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (opining that a city's firing of a part-time police officer was a violation
of the federal Age Discrimination Employment Act); Outsource Int'l., Inc. v. Barton & Barton Staffing Solutions,
192 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from the enforcement of a covenant to
compete in a diversity suit, even though he believed it was "the right disposition from the standpoint of substantive
justice" because an Illinois state court would not have enforced the covenant at bar); Am. Grain Trimmers, Inc. v.
Office of Workers' Comp., 181 F.3d 810, 819 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (ranting against
the administrative law judge's handling of the employer's expert medical witness in a Longshore and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act/death benefits case).
200. See, e.g., infra notes 242-248 and accompanying text.
201. Amerson, 185 F.3d at 690 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
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on the ground below the window that Heard had broken. Amerson denied having
had or tossed any crack.2'
The third paragraph of Judge Posner's dissenting opinion in Amerson mentioned
that although Heard, one of the persons inside the building, refused to testify as a
defense witness in Amerson's criminal trial "on Fifth Amendment grounds," Heard
signed an affidavit which stated that "on the night of the raid he had 'heard police
enter the apartment. Being in possession of two packages of cocaine I ran to the
back bedroom and attempted to dispose of them." 20 3 Posner continued to quote from
the unadmitted affidavit, stating: "'One [of the bags] landed inside. Later one was
found outside. Robert Amerson was unaware of any of this, for he was not yet
present, but was later charged.", 20
Posner departed from his fellow appellate jurists by considering the trial judge's
exclusion of the Heard affidavit as "a clear and prejudicial error" under the standard
of Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(3), requiring, in Posner's view, a new trial.205
As he read the rule, "statements against penal interest offered to exculpate a criminal
defendant [are] inadmissible unless 'corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of a statement."' 2, Thus, as interpreted -by Judge Posner, "it
[was] on the precise meaning of the italicized adverb that the soundness of the
district judge's ruling depend[ed]. '"2 7
Skillfully and concisely laying out the background of the Federal Rules'
exception against hearsay for out-of-court declarations against penal interest and
carefully marshalling the federal appellate caselaw on the subject, Posner distilled
the touchstone of the judicial inquiry as follows: "[D]eciding whether the
corroborating evidence clearly indicates that the trustworthiness of the corroborated
statement requires...consideration not only of the corroborating evidence itself (here
a broken window, as we are about to see) but also of the circumstances in which the
statements were made" that would be indicative "of its trustworthiness or lack
thereof ..such as the competence and incentives of the declarant. '208 According to
Posner' s interpretation, "[c]orroboration was supplied by the broken window, which
indicated that Heard had wanted to throw incriminating evidence out of the
apartment," and the testimony of one Sharon Parker "that Heard had had more than
one packet of cocaine with him, though only one was found in the room, suggesting
that at least one other had made it out of the window. ' 2 9 Posner criticized the
majority because they gave "credit [to] the police testimony over that of the
criminals" regarding Heard's throwing of a packet of cocaine outside the house,
upbraiding his colleagues for not doing their job since "the issue is the admissibility,
not the weight, of Heard's affidavit. '2'0 Deploying relentless logic with a light
202. Id.
203. Id. (quoting Heard affidavit).
204. Id. (quoting Heard affidavit).
205. Id. at 690-91 (citing FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3)).
206. Id. at 691 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).
207. Id.
208. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Id. at 692.
210. Id.
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emotional touch, Posner discerningly and eloquently took the contextual measure
of Heard's motive:
Turning to the critical issue...of motive, I point out that no reason has been given
why Heard, whose affidavit could be used to convict him of possession with
intent to distribute of [sic] almost five times as much crack cocaine as the police
claim that he had, would admit to that possession if it were untrue. Even if the
increment in the amount possessed would not affect his sentence.. .it would ice
the case against him, since it is a confession, which is stronger evidence than the
word of the police. And even if he refused to repeat his admission at his trial, on
Fifth Amendment grounds, his affidavit, which is sworn, could be used to
convict him. So his statement exculpating Amerson was really and substantially
against his penal interest. There is no indication that he and Amerson are friends
or relatives, or that he gave the affidavit in response to a threat, or that he was
paid for it, or that he would rather gum up the works of the criminal justice
system than minimize his own chances of being locked up for the next 15 years,
or that the was trying to curry favor with the police or prosecutors, or that he
wished to distance himself from Amerson, even at the cost of taking all the
blame himself, in order to avoid being charged with conspiracy.2"'
Judge Posner found fault with the district court judge for not "explor[ing] the
circumstances" surrounding the creation of the Heard affidavit before ruling that it
was inadmissible.2"2 Insisting on rigorous performance, Posner explained that "[o]n
the present, incomplete record, Heard's affidavit seems about as trustworthy as other
forms of hearsay that are admitted under one or more of the multitudinous
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 213 While "[tihe district judge thought otherwise...he
did not explain his thinking process, and specifically did not point to anything in the
record that might support his conclusion...."2"4 Posner argued that while "[d]istrict
judges are granted a wide discretion in ruling on issues of evidence, but deferential
does not mean abject-appellate courts do sometimes reverse rulings on evidence,"
deference should "never properly [be] given to rulings the grounds of which are not
explained.. .unless the grounds are obvious. 2 5
Concluding his dissent with the punchy, informal, hard-hitting language that is
the hallmark of a Posner dissenting opinion,216 he offered a clear-eyed, alternative,
cynical explanation of the Amerson facts:
Without Heard's affidavit, it was Amerson's word against that of three police
officers. These are long odds, since Amerson had a criminal record that could
be used to impeach his credibility. Heard's affidavit would have shortened the
odds a bit. A person who is trying to avoid a 15-year sentence is entitled to that
bit. It is not unknown for police to lie in order to get a conviction. It is not
uncommon for police to make a mistake. They may have made one here. (For
that matter, they may have lied). It may have been dark when they opened the
211. Id. (citation omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (citations omitted).
216. See Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 157-61.
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door to Amerson (it was night, and whether the motion-detector light with which
the building was equipped was on or off is hotly contested) and they may have
mistaken an excited gesture with empty hands for the throwing of a package of
crack no bigger than a golf ball. The veracity of the police testimony is
undermined by the prosecutor's insistence (based on I know not what) that
Amerson carried the crack in his hand from his car, which he had parked on the
street in front of the apartment building. I should think it more likely that a crack
dealer would carry the package of crack in his pocket (if as in this case it would
fit in a pocket) until he got inside the house, rather than risk being seen with it
in his hand, or dropping it, or not having the free use of both of his hands.
2 17
J. A Cutting Critique of the Court's Unwillingness to Grant a Rehearing En
Banc
In 2000-anticipating the split over interpretation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) before the Supreme Court and possibly tantalizing the
Court to grant certiorari -Judge Posner filed an incisive dissenting opinion from
the Seventh Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc in Moran v. Rush Prudential,
HMO, Inc.2 9 His opinion is characterized by judicious intelligence. First, he pointed
out the likely costs that the panel decision would trigger for employer-sponsored
ERISA medical-benefit plans.2 Second, he predicted that the court's holding would
provide an invitation to "states to evade the preemptive force of ERISA simply by
deeming its regulations of ERISA plans to be plan terms. '22' Third, his dissent was
217. Amerson, 185 F.3d at 693 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
218. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
219. 230 F.3d 959,973 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). During 2000,
Judge Posner authored two other dissenting opinions: Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that while he concurred with the result, he would have also
accepted the sheriffs employees' claim of qualified immunity in seizing a tenant's guns during an eviction
proceeding), and Kitzman-Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the remand of the case because "it [was] obvious that the district judge [would] have to grant the
defendants immunity-indeed [would] have to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim" in a section 1983 action
by a ward of the State of Illinois).
220. Moran, 230 F.3d at 973 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Posner, in this
regard, pointed out that the Illinois statute "that requires HMOs to submit to review by an independent physician
the decision by the HMO not to cover a treatment deemed medically necessary by the patient's physician...[would]
effect a substantial change in the employer's plan" and, in his view, "[was] not a general regulation of insurance...it
[was] a regulation of HMOs which are the service providers under a great many ERISA medical-benefits plans."
Id. Judge Posner-always insightful in analyzing the costs of regulation-went on in his dissenting opinion to argue
that the Illinois statute "interfered with the federally specified system for enforcing such [health benefit]
entitlements" and "add[ed] heavy new procedural burdens to ERISA plans." Id. With a hint of annoyance, Posner
discussed the predictable new costs that the panel decision would spur:
These burdens do not come without cost. The expense of an arbitration by the independent
physician could easily equal the expense of the medical treatment that the HMO had refused to
authorize. Piling on costs in the administration of ERISA plans will shrink benefits and deter
some employers from offering health insurance at all. In addition, the illinois law obviously is
intended (responding to the torrent of criticisms of HMOs) to tilt the administration of those
plans in favor of participants by giving them an additional remedy while not giving them any
additional remedy to the plan. The law undermines the statutory purpose of federal uniformity
in the administration of ERISA plans. If such laws are permissible, the rights of participants in
an ERISA plan will change as they are transferred by their employer from state to state, even
though they are nominally under the same plan.
Id. at 973-74.
221. Id. at 974.
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cloaked in restrained rhetoric of mild rebuke for the illogical, incomplete panel
decision and the unwillingness of a majority of his Seventh Circuit colleagues to
rehear the case anew. Thus, Posner contended:
This case is well worth the attention of the full court. The panel's decision
creates a square conflict with another circuit, is very probably unsound, and will
affect an enormous number of cases. It is also a single-issue case, and the issue
is one of law, so that en banc consideration would be unlikely to create a
fractured result or bog the court down in factual questions. Rarely have we had
so strong a candidate for en banc review. 22
Moreover, Posner threw a few barbs at the panel decision by noting: "Although
the panel's opinion is long, it does not respond to the [economic] concerns...
although they were forcefully argued in the HMO's brief and in an amicus brief
supporting the HMO" 23; the reasoning of the panel "is just afagon deparler,"224 and
"it would authorize a state to require ERISA plans to double their benefits," thus
constituting a "transparent...evasion of ERISA's preemption clause" with "nothing
that would enable the panel to distinguish that case.' '225 In the final two paragraphs
of his dissent, Posner drove home two "unresolved tension[s]" in the panel opinion:
(1) a recent Supreme Court decision, "which [the panel opinion] does not cite, ' 226
and (2) the incompatibility of two propositions on which the panel opinion depends.
In a final flourish, Judge Posner explained these two tensions:
The [panel] opinion appears to depend on two propositions: first, that the Illinois
law regulates insurance rather than ERISA plans and thus is not preempted;
second, that by virtue of Illinois law the requirement of independent physician
review is written not only into an insurance contract but also into the plan itself,
which makes the requirement enforceable in federal court. The two propositions
are incompatible. If the statute merely regulates insurance and therefore is not
preempted, how can it be part of an ERISA plan and enforceable in federal
court? If, on the other hand, the requirement imposed by the statute is and must
be incorporated into the plan, then Illinois has done more than merely regulate
the contents of an insurance policy. It has regulated the contents of an ERISA
plan-which means that its law is preempted.227
Socrates-known to all for his penetrating questions that undercut his interlocu-
tors' reasoning-would be proud of this Posnerian unmasking.228
222. Id. at 973.
223. Id. at 974.
224. The French phrasefagon deparler means "manner of speaking."
225. Moran, 230 F.3d at 974 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
226. Id. According to Posner, the panel's opinion "[was] in tension with Pegram v. Herdrick," 530 U.S. 211
(2000), "which it [did] not cite." Id. As Posner explained: "Although Pegram held that combined treatment-
eligibility decisions by an HMO are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA, it did not doubt that ERISA applied to
HMO-managed ERISA plans; the panel, by contrast, seems to think ERISA inapplicable to such plans." Id.
227. Id. (emphasis added).
228. Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the Seventh Circuit majority, likewise, suffers from the
logical flaws pointed out in his dissenting opinion. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 533 U.S. 948 (2001).
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K. A Playful Intellectual Romp Examining the Purpose of Child Pornography
Criminal Statutes
Judge Posner authored a rambling, but highly stimulating, professorial style
dissenting opinion from the Seventh Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc in
United States v. Sherman,229 a 2001 case involving the interpretation of a federal
child pornographic statute and the federal sentencing guidelines.230 Posner, it must
be remembered, is fascinated with the interface of human sexuality and the law.23" '
So it is no surprise that he took a rather prosaic issue concerning the appropriateness
of grouping closely related criminal counts for purposes of federal sentencing and
transformed it into a type of seminar paper on comparable types of criminal offenses
where "there are no identifiable victims (e.g., drug or immigration offenses) where
society at large is the victim. 2 32 While Posner' s scolding, academic manner in some
of his dissenting opinions can be off-putting and aesthetically unattractive,233 his
dissent in Sherman is interesting, provocative, and scholarly in the best tradition of
opinions which probe beneath the surface semantics of an issue in an attempt to
uncover a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding.
Toward the beginning of his opinion, Judge Posner offered the reader a summary
of his key dissenting contention:
Since drug and immigration offenses, as I'm about to show, often do have
identifiable secondary victims yet are offered as paradigmatic examples of
"groupable" offenses, I believe that if the child pornography offense in section
2252A of the federal criminal code is like the drug offenses in the code, the
primary "victim" is society at large. And as it is the same victim in all three
counts, Sherman is entitled to have them grouped (with what effect on his
sentence the briefs do not say) without regard to the presence of identifiable
secondary victims.
2 3
At this juncture, Posner provided a poignant policy analysis of two types of
federal criminal statutes that are similar to the child pornography criminal statute at
hand:
I think that the offense in section 2252A is more like a drug offense than it is
like such offenses as murder and robbery, with their clearly identifiable
"primary" victims, and that the children used in the pornography are merely the
secondary victims, much like many of the people employed in the drug
229. 268 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
230. Id. at 550. During 2001, Judge Posner wrote one other dissenting opinion, Malachinski v. Comm'n, 268
F.3d 497, 510 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority's
holding that the U.S. Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to apply the taxpayer's deposit toward his tax deficiency). His
dissent in Malachinski offered telling insights in favor of a more efficient procedure for litigating disputes over
deposits against potential deficiencies-common sense parables like, "If you make a deposit on the purchase of a
lamp, not knowing the price, and the price turns out to be less than the deposit, the seller will refund the
difference-you've 'overpaid."' Id at 511. It also included a thoughtful discussion of the standard of review. Id.
at 511-12.
231. SEX AND REASON, supra note 101.
232. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 550 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
233. See, e.g., Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 129-30, 149-50.
234. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 551 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A (2000)).
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trade-the "mules" who die when the bags of cocaine that they've swallowed
burst, the wives and girlfriends who are roped into assisting their husbands or
boyfriends in the drug trade, the drug dealers killed in gang wars, and the addicts
who turn to selling drugs to support their habit. Nominally, most of these are
"consenting adults," but, realistically, many are coerced or inveigled into
criminal participation. Yet the principal concern behind the criminalization of
drug dealing is not with any of these unfortunates; it is with the consumption of
the drugs and with the entire range of consequences thought to flow from that
consumption. Similarly, many illegal immigrants are abused, sometimes even
enslaved, by employers or by the traffickers in illegal immigrants, but the chief
concern behind the restrictions on immigration is not with those unfortunates but
with the effect of unrestricted immigration on citizen employment, on crime, and
on welfare and other government programs.235
Then, Posner linked the criminal law policies of drug laws and immigration laws
with child pornography laws-all of which, according to his analysis, have society
at large as their primary victims.23 6 Posner contended in this regard:
The adult men and women who perform in pornographic films may be degraded,
exploited, and therefore victimized by their participation in the production of
pornography, as argued in Catherine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (1993), but
they are not the primary victims. No more are the children used in the production
of pornography the primary victims, at least in the judgment of Congress. We
know this from the fact that as part of the Child Pornography Prevention Act
under which Sherman was convicted Congress amended the definition of child
pornography to make clear that it includes pornography created by means of
realistic computer simulations or by using adults made up to look like
children.237
Moreover, Posner construed the statutory language and the legislative history to
express a "parity of concern" regarding "simulated and actual pornography"2 38 that
allowed the inference "that the primary victim is not the child used in the
pornography but the child seduced or molested by a pedophile stimulated by such
pornography. 2 39 Posner also claimed that "we should be realistic and acknowledge
that sheer disgust at [adults] who have a sexual interest in prepubescent children is
a principal motivation for such legislation." 2' 4 Finally, he posited that the only issue
at bar was what Congress thinks the consequences of child pornography should be:
What the actual consequences of child pornography are I do not know; maybe
the primary victims are the children used to make such pornography (maybe, for
that matter, they are the only victims-maybe child pornography is a sex
substitute rather than an incitement-apart from disgusted adults). That is not the
235. Id.
236. Id
237. Id.
238. Id. at 552.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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issue. The issue is whom the statute deems the primary victims to be. Of that
there is little doubt.24'
Accordingly, Posner would have had the Seventh Circuit rehear the matter of
Sherman's sentencing and would have voted to have his conviction for three counts
of possessing child pornography grouped for purposes of sentencing.
L. A Frank Unmasking of a Social Security Disability Denial
In 2002, Judge Posner, in his dissenting opinion in Sims v. Barnhart,242 refused
to go along with what he thought was a travesty of justice and a charade regarding
a claimant's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income (SSI).243 In a searing opening salvo, Posner marshaled the facts in the record,
employing simple but vivid language to demolish the administrative decision below.
He wrote:
According to the uncontroverted facts, the applicant for disability benefits, Linda
Sims, age 46 at the time of the administrative law judge's decision, is of
dwarfish stature (4 feet 9 inches), is anemic, and has a shriveled kidney that may
be responsible for her stratospheric blood pressure (220/108). Her blood pressure
is controllable by medication, but she sometimes forgets to take it. She has had
three strokes, has bouts of depression, a history of alcoholism, and an IQ of only
72-a combination of mental and psychological deficiencies implying a level of
mentation at which it is easy to forget things. She is prone to fainting. The idea
that she is capable, as the administrative law judge found, of doing "light
work"-which is not sedentary work but is light factory work- "standing and
walking (I am quoting the ALJ) for at least six hours per day, with maximum
lifting of twenty pounds and frequent lifting of ten pounds "... is laughable. No
employer would dare to hire her. Her fainting fits alone would make her a
menace to her coworkers as well as herself in a factory setting and expose her
employer to substantial liability....2"
Judge Posner went on to take aim at the administrative law judge's (AL' s)
request of a vocational expert in the hearing. He demanded that the expert "take into
account the fact that Sims had the equivalent of a high-school education" because
"[s]he left school after the eighth grade but later earned a GED certificate." In doing
so, Posner fashioned a colorful analogy to show why the ALJ's approach was
"irrational. 24 According to Posner, "Sims obtained the equivalent of a high-school
241. Id.
242. 309 F.3d 424,432 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 432. During 2002 Posner wrote three other dissenting opinions: Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406,
419 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the state court
judge who presided over plaintiffs' state court capital murder trial engaged in the practice of accepting bribes in
other criminal proceedings but disagreeing that the plaintiffs' death sentences should be reversed), United States
v. D'Ambrosia, 313 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority that the
application of a four level "organizer or leader" enhancement to the defendants' sentences was warranted), and
Perry v. McCaughtry, 308 F.3d 682, 693 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's
rejection of a federal habeus corpus petition because the state court's judgment "that Perry received effective
assistance of counsel was not reasonable, and so Perry is entitled to a new trial").
244. Sims, 309 F.3d at 432 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., dissenting) (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 433.
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education before she had any strokes, a point ignored by the ALJ; he might as well
have said of an Alzheimer's patient that he might still be able to work because he
had a college degree. ' 24 In criticizing the panel majority for denying Sims federal
disability benefits and urging the Social Security Administration to be more careful
in future cases in weighing the combined effects of a claimant's impairments (like
Sims' "low IQ and her high, though theoretically controllable, blood pressure" 247),
Posner ended his dissent with an acerbic, but compelling, manifesto. He stated, "For
Sims, the future is now. She was entitled to a competent examination of the issue of
disability in light of her total impairments. She did not receive it. 2 48
M. A Paean to Upstart Churches and Their Equal Protection Rights
Judge Posner filed five dissenting opinions in 2003, but the most memorable was
his quirky, but dazzling, performance in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City
of Chicago,249 a Posnerian dissent replete with learned constitutional analysis of
governmental zoning powers, deft comparison of irrational social fears of the
mentally retarded with irrational social fears of obscure religious sects, and
illuminating analysis of the law and economics of church and state. At first, Posner
described the functional zones of the City of Chicago insofar as they impact
churches. In Zone 1, which he labeled "residential,"
[c]hurches can locate there without having to obtain a permit from the zoning
board, as can a number of other nonresidential entities, such as clubs,
restaurants, schools, libraries, and drugstores, though restaurants and drugstores
only in high-rise apartment buildings. Other nonresidential land uses in the
residential zone either require a permit or are banned outright.25
Zone 2, which Posner called "commercial," was reserved, in Posner's words, "for
business and other commercial uses, including not only office buildings and retail
stores but also wholesale outlets, warehouses, and light manufacturing, but
excluding certain transportation facilities and heavy manufacturing" where
"churches require a permit."25' Zone 3, which Posner called "manufacturing" land
uses under Chicago's ordinance were limited to "transportation facilities and heavy
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 342 F.3d 752,768 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner's other four dissenting opinions
of 2003 were as follows: Zurba v. United States, 318 F.3d 736, 745 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting) (opining
that while he was "not a literal interpreter of statutes...there should be a reason-in fact, a good, compelling
reason-to ignore statutory language" capping the amount recoverable to the amount originally specified by the
claimant in the notice of claim under the Tort Claims Act), Rice v. McCann, 339 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the criminal drug convict was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and a new trial
because of the court's refusal to admit exculpatory hearsay evidence at a joint trial), Murrell v. Frank, 332 F.3d
1102, 1122 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting) (claiming that the defendant was denied effective counsel because
of a fundamental failure to investigate the facts surrounding a shooting one night "at a nightclub in Milwaukee's
inner city"), and United States v. Randle, 324 F.3d 550, 560 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting) (claiming that
the majority's reversal of a district court's restitution order in bankruptcy was "pointless, as well as erroneous").
250. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 768 (Posner, J., dissenting).
251. Id.
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manufacturing," where "churches are flatly forbidden, although bars, restaurants,
and union lodges are freely permitted. ',252
Secondly, Judge Posner explained the core issue in the case, as he saw it: "The
question is whether the City's restrictions on where churches may locate are
rational" under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.253 Posner
interpreted the Supreme Court and other federal appellate precedent as requiring a
rationality review in "a category of sensitive uses or activities, where judges are to
be more alert for unjustifiable discrimination than in the usual case in which
government regulations are challenged on equal protection grounds."'  Posner read
the leading case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., which
invalidated a zoning ordinance barring group homes for the mentally retarded, as
allowing a kind of "'sliding scale' approach to equal protection" and instantiating
"the proposition that discrimination against sensitive uses is to be given more
careful, realistic, skeptical scrutiny by the courts than discrimination against purely
commercial activities.
Thirdly, Posner analyzed why "[c]hurches are no less sensitive a land use than
homes for the mentally retarded"-but for different reasons. 56 As he argued:
The mentally retarded are victims of irrational fears and cruel scorn; they are
shunned. Religious people are not shunned, but religion arouses strong emotions,
sectarian rivalry is intense and often bitter, and the mixing of religion and
government is explosive. When government singles out churches for special
regulation, as it does in the Chicago ordinance, the risk of discrimination, not
against religion as such-Chicago is not dominated by atheists-but against
particular sects, is great enough to require more careful judicial scrutiny than in
the ordinary equal protection challenge to zoning.257
Fourthly, in Posner's most remarkable and innovative portion of his dissent, he
elaborated on the law and economics of church and state in America and why it is
important to our constitutional values to foster religious competition. 58 Posner
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 769 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
256. Id. at 770.
257. 1d
258. Id. at 770-72. One of the problems, as Posner saw it, was between "well-established sects" and "new,
small, or impecunious churches." Id. at 770. Citing an internet website, Posner opined:
Not only did [the well-established religious sects] acquire the land on which their churches are
built in residential areas when such land was relatively cheap and abundant, and therefore
affordable by noncommercial entities, such as churches (and there are of course some wealthy
churches); in addition, because nonconforming uses are grandfathered, the churches that have
managed to get permission to build over the years in nonresidential zones are untouchable. But
what of new, small, or impecunious churches, such as the 40 to 50 obscure sects, one of which
has only 15 members, that compose the principal plaintiff, Civil Liberties for Urban Believers?
And obscure they are. It is telling that of the six other named plaintiffs-Christ Center (150
members), Christian Covenant Outreach Church (ministering to teenagers and former gang
members), His Word Ministries to All Nations, Christian Bible Center (35 members), Church
on the "Way" Praise Center, and Monte de Sion Church-only one (Christian Bible Center) is
on the city's list of area churches.
ld. at 770.
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pontificated that "[a]s David Hume would have predicted, the greater vitality of
American religion than of religion in countries in which there is an established
church or churches owes much to our unwillingness to allow government to favor
particular sects. 259 Moreover, he claimed:
Religious competition presupposes free entry into the religious "marketplace."
A new church is unlikely, however, to have the resources necessary for building
its place of worship in a residential area other than a slum, especially as the
Chicago ordinance requires that the church provide parking, which will mean
that unless its building is tiny it will have to acquire more than one city lot. A
church that wants to build in the commercial zone, where land is cheaper, must
obtain a special permit; and if it wants to build in the manufacturing zone, it is
out of luck unless it can procure an amendment to the zoning ordinance.2 °
As Judge Posner viewed the matter, "storefront churches"-located in non-
residential neighborhoods of American cities-would continue to increase because
of a combination of tighter zoning laws and sky-rocketing real estate prices where
"the only place for churches to turn to are existing commercial spaces." 261 And, even
though "Chicago's prohibition against locating a church in the commercial zone is
not absolute" because of the possibility of obtaining a special permit, "obtaining one
is costly for a marginal enterprise; the zoning board enjoys broad discretion in
deciding whether to grant or deny a permit; and a public hearing is required at which
opposition to the church's application for a permit is predictable because churches
do not enhance commercial activity.,
262
Fifthly, Posner objected to the "absurdly paternalistic" argument by the City that
"it is bad for the churches themselves to be located in commercial or industrial areas,
because of noise and commotion. 263 From his perspective, deciding whether to
locate "is a judgment for the church to make rather than government, by trading off
the cost to the church of noisy and profane surroundings against the benefits in
lower costs of land acquisition and proximity to sinners, including prostitutes, drug
addicts, and gang members."2"
Concluding his dissenting opinion, Judge Posner stated: "Chicago's zoning
ordinance imposes the same severe burden on new churches that the ordinance
invalidated in the Cleburne case imposed on homes for the mentally retarded, and
with no greater justification. In doing so it denied the plaintiffs the equal protection
of the laws. 2 65
IV. SOME THEORETICAL INSIGHTS REGARDING JUDGE POSNER'S
EVOLVING DISSENTING STYLE
As explained below, the maturing dissenting opinion style of Judge Posner has
been characterized by two key qualities: humanistic dissent and legalistic dissent.
259. Id. (providing citation to economic analysis of religion journal articles).
260. Id. at 770-71.
261. Id. at 771.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 772.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 773.
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A. Humanistic Dissent
During his second decade or so tenure as a federal appellate judge, from 1992
through 2003, Judge Posner surprisingly used many of his most memorable
dissenting opinions to advance what might be called a humanistic concern for values
of benevolence, kindness, and sympathy. 21 Opinions that best characterize this style
of humanistic dissent were in Hamilton v. O'Leary,267 Johnson v. Phelan,268 United
States v. Redmon, 269 United States v. Amerson,270 Sims v. Barnhart,27' and Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago.272 Eschewing moral theory,273
Judge Posner's evolving style of humanistic dissent is based on his penetrating
dissection of the facts at bar, whether the factual record involves statistical
probabilities, social norms, or economic dimensions. 4 In the course of Judge
Posner's humanistic, fact-focused dissents, he is at his best when he transcends his
more typical concern for efficiency to stake out worthy ends that he believes the law
should pursue such as prisoner dignity, compassion for the severely disabled, and
even-handed religious competition. 27" Given that Posner's dissenting rate
266. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 350-59 (Thomas 0. Sloane ed., 2001) (discussing the
attitude of mind of humanism from the time of the European Renaissance to modem times).
267. 976 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting) (ruminating on statistical probabilities and the
injustice of allowing a prison's revocation of an inmate's good time credits based on collective guilt for constructive
possession of weapons found in a common vent shared by other prisoners); see also supra notes 38-47 and
accompanying text.
268. 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (protesting
thoughtfully against the indignity of allowing female prison guards to monitor naked male inmates and concluding
that federal courts should seek to eliminate cruel psychological punishments as well as beastly physical torture);
see supra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
269. 138 F.3d 1109, 1128 (7th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (outlining the privacy interests
that should attend a person's garbage on his property by imagining the ways that government might unconscionably
intrude on an ordinary person's life by gathering the refuse and reconstructing private secrets); see supra notes
178-197 and accompanying text.
270. 185 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (objecting temperately to the exclusion of an
exculpatory affidavit of a third party declarant given the possibility that the police made a mistake or might have
lied in circumstances where the defendant was facing a fifteen-year prison sentence for drug possession with intent
to distribute); see supra notes 198-217 and accompanying text.
271. 309 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., dissenting) (indicting in a biting tone the denial of federal
disability insurance benefits to a dwarfish, alcoholic, depressed, low-IQ woman who was prone to fainting spells);
see supra notes 242-248 and accompanying text.
272. 342 F.3d 752, 768 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting) (analyzing the constitutional value of
protecting storefront urban churches from arbitrary governmental zoning restrictions in a sensitive yet piercing
opinion); see supra notes 249-265 and accompanying text.
273. Cf. PROBLEMATICS, supra note 92 (arguing against grand notions of moral theory and in favor of a
greater understanding of the social, economic, and political facts of legal disputes).
274. But see Linda E. Fisher, Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical
Reality, 31 N.M. L. REv. 455 (2001). Professor Fisher argued that, in his more mature appellate opinions, "Posner
engages in a [pragmatic] wide-ranging search for useful empirical information derived from an extremely broad
array of sources," and "[h]e frequently relies on extra-record fact, apparently discovered through his own
independent research." Id. at 456. In her examination of a variety of Posner's majority, concurring, and separate
opinions during the latter years of his judicial career, Fisher argued that Posner's opinion methodology is subject
to criticism because "at times, Judge Posner acts like a chancellor in equity, independently adjudicating facts and
sometimes ignoring settled law, rather than as an appellate judge reviewing lower court decisions." Id. at 458. This
is, according to Fisher, because "[tihe facts and methods he relies on can skirt the edges of appropriate means of
establishing validity, and can undermine deference to the parties' role in presenting evidence." Id.
275. Cf. Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal
Pragmatism, 113 YALE LJ. 687, 741 (2003) (book review) ("Posner is not interested in promoting methods for the
Winter 20061
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
appreciably declined during his latter years on the Seventh Circuit and is, in terms
relative to other federal court judges,276 reasonably moderate, one suspects that on
those occasions when Judge Posner dissents for humanistic reasons, the legal
community listens.
While Judge Posner demonstrated empathy in a handful of dissenting opinions
during his first ten years on the federal appellate bench,277 this evolving dissenting
style during his more recent years as a judge shows a resolution of his propensity for
empathy into a praxis of worldly wisdom infused with practical reason. Unlike many
appellate judges who merely know the sterile law, Judge Posner has exhibited
Ciceroian qualities of passionate conviction counterbalanced by cool reason.278
Posner's evolving style of humanistic dissent seeks to put law into practice and
make the law a practical tool for noble human ends. Judge Posner's maturing
dissenting opinions reflect his wide-ranging knowledge of history, philosophy,
politics, and law, in conjunction with his everyday mastery of economics. In over
twenty years as an appellate judge, Posner has demonstrated his dexterity in putting
passion to the service of proof.
B. Legalistic Dissent
Sometimes, in Posner's evolving dissenting style, he tended to cut against the
grain of human compassion and empathy for discrete human beings to urge his
judicial colleagues to, instead, make hard choices necessitated by the law. This
second stylistic dissenting style, which evolved during his latter years as a federal
appellate judge, might be called "legalistic dissent." During 1992 through 2003,
Posnerian opinions that best exemplify this secondary style of legalistic dissent were
Todd v. Socitg Bic, 279 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman,280 Jansen v. Packaging
Corp. of America,281 Moran v. Rush Prudential, HMO, Inc.,282 and United States v.
Sherman.283
community to develop shared ideals. Rather, the pressing need is for a set of elite managers to serve as efficiency
experts, whose goal is to find the most efficient means to achieve our inherited ends.").
276. See Unpacking the Statistics, supra note 4; Choosing, supra note 4.
277. See Dissent Aesthetics, supra note 5, at 155-56.
278. See generally CICERO THE ADVOCATE (Jonathan Powell & Jeremy Patterson eds., 2004) (discussing
Cicero's forensic speeches in ancient Rome in terms of effective techniques of persuasion in legal cases).
279. 9 F.3d 1216, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (attempting
to convince his en banc colleagues to resist certifying a question of strict liability tort law to a state supreme court
in a case where the facts were limited to a small child who used a cigarette lighter to set a fire that killed another
small child), aftd, 21 F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994); see supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
280. 29 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority's application
of a federal banking statute, which had the effect of protecting errant bank directors from civil damages); see supra
notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
281. 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging his fellow
judges in the majority to seriously think through the implications of an ambiguous U.S. Supreme Court precedent
on sexual discrimination in the workplace and to distinguish categories of cases where the more plaintiff-friendly
strict liability standard should govern an employer's liability); see supra notes 140-177 and accompanying text.
282. 230 F.3d 959,973 (7th Cit. 2000) (Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (critiquing
the court's unwillingness to grant an en banc hearing to a case that presented a difficult and paradoxical fit between
a federal statute and a state statute even though the easy path was to allow the injured HMO claimant to prevail on
her claim against her HMO); see supra notes 219-228 and accompanying text.
283. 29 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from a denial of a rehearing
en banc on the issue of whether a child pornographer should have the benefit of his three separate counts of
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Judge Posner's secondary style of legalistic dissent-like his primary style of
humanistic dissent-as manifested during 1992 through 2003, essentially involved
appeals to practical reason. Posner's style of legalistic dissent, while focused on the
need for the appellate court to grapple with legal uncertainties or ambiguities, also
skillfully utilized emotional appeals designed to persuade his judicial colleagues of
the wisdom of tackling a matter of legal interpretation or exegesis sooner rather than
later, or vice versa.
C. Attractive Opinions
Among all of Judge Posner's dissenting judicial opinions decided during 1992
through 2003, three opinions demonstrated aesthetic panache: Johnson v. Phelan,
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. ofAmerica, and United States v. Redmon.2 4 In Johnson
and Redmon, examples of humanistic dissent, Posner created dissenting judicial
performances that achieved great beauty by enticing the reader to identify with the
hapless targets of the criminal justice system. In Johnson, Posner used forms of
argument and visual imagery that make us imagine the human indignity of having
prison guards of the opposite sex observe our every move and sometimes see us
naked and helpless.285 In Redmon, Posner identified basic expectations of
privacy--even in our garbage on our own property-that we would hope would be
free of invasion from the prying eyes of government officials.286 In Jansen, an
instance of legalistic dissent, Posner captured our attention by clarifying the murky
state of the law of employer liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor and,
through his incisive, situation-specific analysis of different types of sexual
harassment, convinced us of the wisdom of a nuanced approach to liability
dependent on the incentives of the employer in different contexts.287
D. Unattractive Opinions
Despite his evolution in the latter part of his judicial career to an enhanced and
attractive overarching judicial dissenting opinion style, at times between 1992 and
2003, Judge Posner exhibited an unattractive dissenting style, as he occasionally did
during his first decade on the bench. 288 Most striking, Posner's 1996 dissent in
American International Adjustment Co. v. Galvin28 9 is an ugly dissenting opinion
because the dissent forgets about cost/benefit considerations and goes over the top
in seeking to personally embarrass the trial lawyer for the insurance company and
his expert witness.290 Even Judge Posner needs to remember the importance for an
appellate judge to pick his battles with care and, when dissenting, to avoid
aggressive and mean-spirited personal attacks.
possession grouped together for purposes of criminal sentencing); see supra notes 229-241 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 268, 269, 281.
285. See supra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 178-197 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 140-177 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
289. 86 F.3d 1455, 1462 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
290. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
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V. THE AESTHETICS OF DISSENTING STYLE AND
POSSIBLE JUDICIAL CANONICITY
When we as legal scholars and practicing lawyers look at the corpus of an
eminent jurist's judicial opinions over the course of a long career on the bench, we
might be tempted to engage in ideological analysis and debate. Pursuing this kind
of project, we would be interested in staking out what legal doctrines and principles
and interpretations are "good" or "progressive" or "correct" and to compare a
judge's judicial opinions to this ideological construct. That is not an enterprise I am
interested in pursuing. Rather, I seek to bypass such contentious and now somewhat
tired ideological debates and to explore, in relation to the dissenting judicial
opinions of Judge Posner during roughly his first two decades on the federal
appellate bench, how aesthetic pleasure plays into what we in the legal community
find valuable, how this can change over time, and how chance works on the
formation of the judicial canon. I am inspired in this aesthetic approach by two
recent publications: (1) Sir Frank Kermode's Berkeley Tanner Lectures of
November 2001, along with the responses of invited literary commentators, which
resulted in the book Pleasure and Change: The Aesthetics of Canon,29' and (2)
Crispin Sartwell's elegant and enticing book, Six Names of Beauty.292
Lawyers and law professors might be inclined to object to applying aesthetic
approaches to judicial opinions on the grounds that law is both more practical and
more political than mere literature (and the philosophy of beauty) and that judicial
opinions are, therefore, different in kind from works of literary art or philosophy.
Perhaps there is some truth in this view. As Posner, himself, has explained, there
exist fundamental differences between law and literature, which are rooted in the
different social functions of legal and literary texts.293 But, as Posner has also
demonstrated, there are areas of mutual illumination between legal texts, like
judicial opinions, and literary texts, like novels and poems. 294 In the same spirit that
Posner wrote about economics and literature,29 I contend that great judicial opinions
merge with the mix of great economic texts and great works of literature and
beautiful objects at the level of aesthetic virtue.29
291. FRANK KERMODE, PLEASURE AND CHANGE: THE AESTHETICS OF CANON (Robert Alter ed., 2004)
[hereinafter AESTHETiCS OF CANON].
292. CRISPIN SARTWELL, Six NAMES OF BEAUTY (2004).
293. See LAW AND ITERATURE, supra note 37, at 246-51.
294. See id. at 255-302 (examining judicial opinions as literature).
295. "The level at which economics and literature begin to merge is, surprisingly, the aesthetic." Id. at 301
(emphasis added).
296. As Posner trenchantly observed:
Economics is beautiful to those who know enough of it to be able to read economic books and
articles and who have an aesthetic sense. Elegance, concision, surprise, precision, form,
metaphor, narrative, example, economy of expression, architectonic order, mystery, wit...these
aesthetic virtues are to be found at the highest levels of economic scholarship, just as they are
to be found in imaginative literature and in the physical sciences.
Id. at 301-02.
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Accordingly, under headings of pleasure, change, and chance,297 I shall discuss
the aesthetics of Judge Posner's maturing dissenting judicial opinion style with the
ultimate philosophical objective of assessing the possible canonical status of some
of his dissenting opinions.
A. Pleasure
When trying to theorize what pleasure in reading judicial opinions entails, it is
probably advisable to eschew grand synthesis and to proceed "episodically and
ruminatively.""29 An initial take regarding what is involved in reading canonical (or
potentially canonical) judicial opinions is to note that there is something funda-
mentally different about the pleasure of reading a great judicial opinion, on the one
hand, and physical pleasures like sipping a glass of sherry, taking a hot shower, or
engaging in sexual relations, on the other hand.2 This epistemological difference
is not necessarily the difference between "simple and complex pleasures"' "' since,
by analogy of reading Proust to reading an outstanding judicial opinion,
[t]he pleasure of a hot shower is no doubt simpler than the pleasure of reading
Proust, but it is not self-evident that, say, the pleasure of sexual consummation,
especially when an intense relationship between the partners is involved, is less
complex than the reading experience, though it is surely quite different in
kind. °
While the precise nature about the difference between physical pleasures and
literary pleasures is difficult to pin down, a useful point of departure is to
comprehend a literary canon as being, in Alter's words, "a trans-historical
community of texts" that "lives its cultural life through a constant dynamic interplay
between each new text and an unpredictable number of antecedent texts and formal
norms and conventions. '32 As Kermode explains: "[E]ach member [of the canon]
297. This three-part schema was suggested by Robert Alter from Frank Kermode's Berkeley Tanner Lectures.
See Robert Alter, Introduction to AESTHETICS OF CANON, supra note 291, at 3 ("Two of [Kermode's] three central
terms-pleasure and change-appear as the titles of his two lectures, and the third [implicitly contained] is
chance.").
298. Id. at 6.
299. Cf id. at 6-7 (discussing the distinction between simple and complex pleasures in the context of the
pleasure afforded by a great work of literature).
300. Id. at 6.
301. Id. at 6-7.
302. Id. at 7. Alter's observation was based on Kermode's reference to Czech critic Jan Mukalovsk,.
According to Kermode:
While I was thinking...I remembered...Czech critic Jan Mukatovsk , who happened to be
interested in aesthetic pleasure, not yet a taboo subject. Broadly speaking, he argued that the
poetic object might be studied with formalist severity as artifact, but that its aesthetic purpose
is achieved only by the action of a responsive reader. This response will certainly be conditioned
by the norms and values of the reader's community, but also by individual choices and
characteristics-very roughly speaking, by what gives him or her pleasure. Mukafovsk9 further
believed that part of the pleasure and the value its presence indicates and measures is likely to
lie in the power of the object to transgress, to depart, interestingly and revealingly, from the
accepted ways of such artifacts.
Thus, to qualify as possessing an aestheticfunction, the work mustgivepleasure, and it must
also be new. Mukatovsk
, 
believed that such works had value because they gave pleasure to the
individual, and were at the same time socially valuable because of the common element in the
response of serious readers.
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fully exists only in the company of others; one member nourishes or qualifies
another...."3°3 Thus, "[t]his impulse of innovation" may be a useful benchmark to
"distinguish the pleasure of the text from at least the simpler kinds of extraliterary
pleasures.,, 3' This "purposeful novelty," as a distinguishing characteristic of literary
pleasure from mere physical pleasure, might be expressed as follows:
If you enjoy a hot shower after exercise, you might be disconcerted by a
noticeable alteration in the water pressure or temperature. If you are an admirer
of the novels of Philip Roth, you certainly don't want Sabbath's Theater to give
you exactly the same pleasure you experienced in reading The Counterlife or a
novel by anybody else, and its utterly surprising fusion of obscenity, hilarity, and
somber existential seriousness is innovative and transgressive in precisely the
way Kermode, paraphrasing Mukafovsk, suggests a literary work should be.3"5
A handful of Judge Posner's dissenting opinions, over the course of his more than
twenty years as a federal appellate judge, exhibit a purposeful novelty coupled with
explicit and implicit affirmations of belonging to the textual community of great
American appellate judicial opinions. In the best of his dissents, Posner reveals his
gift for offering the reader a fresh representation of critical concepts-both legal
concepts and those that can shed light on the law-as well as penetrating evaluations
that carry a remarkable gravity. Thus, among his dissenting opinions written during
his first decade as a judge, the following sample provides the kind of literary
aesthetic pleasure described by Kermode: (1) DePass v. United States30 6 and Dimeo
v. Griffin3"7 (where Posner implicitly invoked the memory of the classic Learned
Hand decision, which discussed mathematical concepts in everyday English to
explain, in his own common parlance, the nature of statistical knowledge in one
dissent and the nature of risk in another);308 (2) International Union, UA W v.
AESTHETICS OF CANON, supra note 291, at 19 (emphasis added).
303. AESTHETICS OF CANON, supra note 291, at 33.
304. Alter, supra note 297, at 7.
305. Id. at 7-8.
306. 721 F.2d 203, 209-10 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
307. 924 F.2d 664, 676-77 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J., dissenting).
308. "[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947) (showing Judge Learned Hand's classic formulation of negligent conduct).
[A] judge is not free to say, in my court we do not allow statistical inference. Knowledge
increasingly is statistical, and judges must not let themselves lag too far behind the progress of
knowledge. As a matter of fact they have not lagged. The kind of evidence that the district judge
rejected in this case, evidence of probability of survival, invariably based on studies of a group
of people rather than of just the individual plaintiff, is an increasingly common basis for
awarding damages.
DePass, 721 F.2d at 209-10 (discussing statistical knowledge).
[W]e have a persuasive argument...that horse racing under the influence of drugs poses a danger
to life and limb.
Not-granted-the same level of danger as would be created by placing the Strategic Air
Command in the hands of drug addicts. But magnitude of danger is not the only consideration.
Probability of accident is also important. The product of magnitude and probability is, indeed,
expected accident cost. That cost is high in horse racing because it is a dangerous sport and
because the inherent dangers interact with the loss ofjudgment and control caused by drug use
to make the drug-infested horse race a scene of enormous danger.
Dimeo, 924 F.2d at 676-77 (discussing the nature of risk).
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Johnson Controls, Inc.3°  (where Posner implicitly invoked the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion striking down a state's forced sterilization statute to presciently
explain why a corporate policy that prohibited women workers, who might become
pregnant, from working in a battery production facility should not be summarily
affirmed without a detailed examination of "a host of unanswered questions" that
did not appear in the frozen, summary judgment record of the case);at° and (3) In re
Sanderfoot3" (where Posner echoes the tenor of the critical dissent of Justice
William Rehnquist in United States Steelworkers of America v. Weber, castigating
the majority for misinterpreting the language and purpose of a federal employment
discrimination statute, to vehemently disagree with the statutory reasoning and result
of the Seventh Circuit panel decision, which held that a former wife's lien on the
marital home was avoidable, under a federal bankruptcy statute, as impairing the
former husband's homestead exemption).31 2
During his second decade, or so, as a federal appellate judge, Judge Posner
continued to write breathtakingly original dissenting opinions that provided pleasure
to the reader because of Posner's innovative impulse and surprising fusion of
argumentative techniques and transgressive (making the issue "new") artistry. Thus,
in dissents written during his maturing years on the bench-most strikingly
illustrated by his humanistic-style dissents in Johnson v. Phelan313and United States
v. Redmon,314 and his legalistic-style dissent in Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of
America31 -Judge Posner enticed the reader to change dominant social paradigms:
from a norm that prisoners have no dignitary rights to a view that they should not
be subjected to "unnecessary cross-sex surveillance";31 6 from a standard that
criminal defendants have no privacy rights in their garbage to a suggested standard
that government "searches, including searches of garbage, that take place within the
curtilage of the defendant's property must comply with the Fourth Amendment's
restrictions on searches";31 7 from a criterion of using blackletter Restatement agency
rules to resolve "statutory tort[s] of employment discrimination" created by
309. 886 F.2d 871, 902-08 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
310. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("We are dealing with legislation which involves
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects."); Johnson
Controls, 886 F.2d at 902-08 (Posner, J., dissenting) (examining and commenting on the economics of
discrimination, noting "the feasibility of warnings as a substitute for a blanket exclusion of all fertile women," and
the questionable justification of Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy given instances when the policy is
"excessively cautious").
311. 899 F.2d 598, 606-08 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
312. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that it was against Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to allow reverse discrimination against a white
worker with greater seniority rights than minority workers who displaced Weber in a craft training program); see
also Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606-08 (Posner, J., dissenting) (utilizing subtle emotional with logical analysis based
on the text of the bankruptcy statute, the intent of Congress, precedent from other federal circuits, the tradition of
equity in bankruptcy law, and policy analysis that indicated no institutional or systemic concerns that conflicted with
his dissenting statutory interpretation).
313. See supra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 178-197 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 140-177 and accompanying text.
316. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
317. United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1129 (7th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
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Congress to a policy-rational framework of potential employer liability for the
sexual harassment of an employee by a supervisor, on the one hand, and a non-
supervisory co-worker, on the other hand. a18
Another way to describe the special pleasure that the finest Posnerian judicial
dissents provide the reader is to utilize the Hebrew word "yapha," which means "to
be bright, to glow. '3 9 As Professor Sartwell explains this meaning of beauty:32
[F]irst of all, we might notice that the term ["yapha"] indicates a quality of the
beautiful thing or person rather than of the perceiver: a thing, as it were, sheds
or exudes its beauty. Beauty is something the beautiful object emits, like a light:
a thing is beautiful in virtue of what it gives. A possibly related Aramaic term
means to burst forth or to bloom, which is in turn related to the Arabic "wadu'a",
to become beautiful, as well as "ward-un" (rose or blossom), and "warada"
(blossoming tree).
I have no evidence to support the assertion.. .but it seems to me likely that the
human aesthetic sense arose not, for example, from the awesome majesty of a
forest, mountain, sunset, but by the sudden burst or blossom of energized color
into the field of vision: the flower, the fruit, the butterfly, the bird....The
environment as a whole, or large chunks of it, is something that is largely taken
for granted by the time one reaches awareness, though the sense of its quality
can be refreshed, but beauty arises first in what stands out from that environment
because of its unusual shape, bright coloration: the arousal of the senses.321
Indeed, the best Posnerian dissenting opinions burst into the reader's conscious-
ness with an eruption of energized color--different in kind from the staid, stodgy,
and pure style of judicial opinion.322 Rather, Judge Posner's attractive, impure323
style of opinion writing, in his own words, "eschew[s] the 'professionalizing'
devices of the purist writer-the jargon, the solemnity, the high sheen, the imper-
sonality, the piled-up details conveying an attitude of scrupulous exactness, the
fondness for truisms,324 and the like.
Perhaps Posner's impure style of dissent captures the reader's fancy, in the most
comely of his dissenting opinions, by virtue of another aspect of what we might find
beautiful: the Japanese word "wabi-sabi," roughly translated as "humility" or
"imperfection." 325 A dimension of what makes many Posnerian dissenting opinions
318. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
319. SARTWELL, supra note 292, at 28.
320. According to Sartwell, his book is premised on the meaning of beauty in six different languages:
beauty (English): the object of longing
yapha (Hebrew): glow, bloom
sundara (Sanskrit): whole, holy
to kalon (Greek): idea, ideal
wabi-sabi (Japanese): humility, imperfection
hozho (Navajo): health, harmony.
Id. at xii.
321. Id. at 28.
322. See Sexy Style, supra note 4, at 663-64 (comparing pure and impure judicial opinion styles).
323. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
324. Sexy Style, supra note 4, at 663 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Judge's Writing Styles (and Do They
Matter?), 62 U. CmI. L REV. 1421, 1430 (1995)).
325. SARTwELL, supra note 292, at xii. As Sartwell explains:
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aesthetically beautiful is the wabi-sabi nature of his groping for legal answers, his
attempts to sketch out the contours of a particular subject, his essential humility. An
example of this type of austere, wabi-sabi, beauty is Judge Posner' s dissent in Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago,26 a case where his law and
economics analysis of "storefront" churches competing with mainline churches is
rough around the edges, but decidedly illuminating.
B. Change
The notion of change, in literary terms, "is a mark of the provisionality of
canons" '327 in different historical eras. "It seems unexceptionable that as cultural eras
change and as we change individually, or even idiosyncratically, the canon we
imagine we are reading changes as well, in regard to both how we see the works and
what works are included. 328
With regard to a hypothetical canon 329 of stellar American judicial opinions,
William Domnarski has suggested that there are certain touchstones that define
judicial canoncity. For Domnarski there are six criteria for the American judicial
canon: "[T]he judicial opinion (1) comes from the United States Supreme Court, (2)
establishes or acts as a harbinger of (3) an important rule (4) affecting a fundamental
aspect (5) of the American democracy or the American way of life (6) with clarity,
[W] abi-sabi is an aesthetic of poverty and loneliness, imperfection and austerity, affirmation and
melancholy. Wabi-sabi is the beauty of the withered, weathered, tarnished, scarred, intimate,
coarse, earthly, evanescent, tentative, ephemeral....Wabi-sabi is a broken earthenware cup in
contrast to a Ming vase, a branch of autumn leaves in contrast to a dozen roses, a lined and bent
old woman in contrast to a model, a mature love as opposed to an infatuation, a bare wall with
peeling paint in contrast to a wall hung with beautiful paintings.
Id. at 114.
326. See supra notes 249-265 and accompanying text.
327. Alter, supra note 297, at 5.
328. Id. As Kermode explains in his own words, change impacts canonicity in the way that "retrieval of
forgotten music" by coming across, for example, a compact disc in a music store might, if it were replicated by
several individuals, "mark changes in the understanding of the audience" of what great music was all about.
AESTHETICS OF CANON, supra note 291, at 34. Kermode goes on, in this regard, to explain how an obscure opera
by Handel, Rinaldo, composed in the early eighteenth century and dismissed by music critics of that era, might
come to be admired by twenty-first century music aficionados:
How explain this change? We have a modern familiarity with the baroque; we have scholars who
understand it, and singers and musicians who know how to perform it; we can accommodate the
heroic or pathetic gestures, the long recitatives, and the de capo arias. Our map of musical
history has been redrawn; we have discovered how to listen to this music, a different skill from
listening to Mozart or Verdi or Wagner. The change is fueled by more generous notions in
ourselves; nothing has happened to the operas except they have come to be understood in their
own pleasure-giving terms. We have made this music modern by acts of historical
understanding; we have changed it and released its power to please. So, the canon expands. Of
course, a withdrawal of attention can by the same token contract it.
Changes in the canon obviously reflect changes in ourselves and our culture. It is a register
of how our historical self-understandings are formed and modified.
Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
329. To be part of any canon requires a work to be authoritative and accepted as representing the very best
of a particular genre by the elite in the relevant field. How this process takes place, of course, is the really interesting
question. As the balance of this article attempts to explain, the following variables impact judicial canonicity: (1)
the pleasure a judicial opinion provides the readers, (2) how the perceptions of pleasure change over time, and (3)
chance.
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conviction, or eloquence. 330 Maybe Domnarski is on to something. He has even
claimed that there could be other judicial canons: "There could be a canon of
subclasses of constitutional jurisprudence," such as Supreme Court decisions
involving the "interpretation of the commerce clause, the due process clause, and the
privilege and immunities clause. 33 l There could "be a canon for an audience look-
ing at opinions as literature" involving "eloquent, moving, and literate passages. ' '332
There could be a canon of great dissenting opinions by all American appellate
judges, a canon of superb federal court of appeals decisions, or a canon of out-
standing concurring opinions by all American appellate judges. And for subject
matter aficionados, we might imagine a canon of remarkable judicial opinions in
environmental law, tort law, contract law, labor law, civil procedure, securities law,
bankruptcy law, and so on.
Without getting into the controversial area of rigid, timeless judicial canonicity
criteria,334 I think it intriguing to speculate why other judges and legal scholars have,
in recent years, found the judicial opinions of Judge Posner interesting and
attractive 33' and, specifically, why some of Posner's dissenting opinions might be
viewed as outstanding dissents at the fin de sicle336 of the last century and in the
opening decades of the twenty-first century. I offer four tentative reasons, all related
to cultural change, for this Posnerian pull. First, Posner's dissenting opinions
frequently use the parlance of law and economics, a jargon that has become
mainstream during the last two decades. Second, Posner is one of the founders and
chief exponents in his academic, non-judicial, writings of Law and Economics
analysis.337 Third, Posner's candor and work-in-progress style of informal writing
are refreshing and appealing to modem day legal professionals. Finally, Posner
knows how to explain complicated matters in simple, easy-to-understand language.
C. Chance
Could it be that what we legal savants might find canon-worthy in the category
of judicial dissenting opinions might be, in large measure, due to chance? The
observation of literary theorists are thought-provoking on this issue. As Robert Alter
interprets Frank Kermode's Berkeley Tanner Lecture:
Because we all like to have firm handles to grasp when we try to make sense of
complex phenomena, the usual assumptions we make about the [literary] canon
are that it is somehow intentional, possibly on the part of writers who aspire to
enter it and clearly on the part of communities of readers who fix the canon, and
330. WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 77 (1996).
331. Id. at 76.
332. Id.
333. In a sense, American casebooks, which reproduce edited versions of appellate decisions, are implicitly
suggesting subject matter judicial canons.
334. Cf. Alter, supra note 297, at 5 (stating that the old school critic, "Matthew Arnold conceived his [literary]
touchstones, drawn from such texts as the Iliad, the Divine Comedy, and the plays of Shakespeare, as enduringly
valid, not really subject to change").
335. See, e.g., supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text.
336. While this French term is typically used in connection with the end of the nineteenth century, it also
refers to the end of any century. See http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9125584.
337. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW (6th ed., 2003).
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that, in keeping with this intentionality, it reflects certain intrinsic qualities in the
works included, whether formal, aesthetic, moral, social, psychological, or
ideological. Kermode, citing a couple of examples, suggests that canon
formation might be more like a chess game in which from time to time the
pieces get scrambled by some blind force of circumstance.
There are, for example, 150 psalms in the canonical biblical collection, which
would appear to be a kind of anthology spanning several centuries of poetic
production. Some of these, of course, are magnificent poems. At least a few
others are rather formulaic and may strike many modern readers as relatively
undistinguished. Did these poems make it into what would become the biblical
canon because the ancient editors deemed them the 150 finest instances of
psalmodic poetry in Hebrew, or because they best expressed the pieties of
Israelite monotheism? Some of the psalms were obviously preserved because
they had become fixtures in the temple service. But chance cannot be entirely
excluded from the making of the canonical anthology. One is haunted by the
thought of a Hebrew psalm as sublime as Psalm 8 or as eloquently moving as
Psalm 23 that did not survive as part of the canon for the simple reason that the
scroll on which it was recorded turned to dry dust in an ancient urn before the
editors could include it in their authoritative collection. Kermode's notion of
chance is surely worth keeping in mind as a salutary admonition to bland
confidence in whatever generalizations about the canon we may make.338
A number of lighthearted (but potentially serious) questions of the role of chance
in the potential canonicity of Judge Posner's dissenting judicial opinions are
instigated by the notion of chance in the literary canon. First, would an economically
focused intellectual like Posner have ever been appointed to the federal appellate
bench but for the American political contingencies of Watergate, Jimmy Carter's
election on the tide of Watergate, and the conservative backlash represented by
Ronald Reagan's election to the Presidency? Second, is the sheer star quality of
Posner' s polymathic output of fascinating books and articles a reason for his judicial
notoriety?.339 What if Posner were a typical working federal appellate judge and was
content to simply decide appeals without delving into all matter of intellectual fare
in extra-judicial writings? 34 Third, is it likely in future decades that lawyers will
338. Alter, supra note 297, at 4. Kermode explains in his lecture remarks:
[T]here is an element of chance in canonicity, and many examples testify to the truth of this. We
ourselves make canons by attending closely to texts and contexts, but there may be among those
texts some we choose not to attend to and which remain there by inertia. Other works may have
some claim to be treated as canonical but aren't. Many authors have been rescued from neglect,
but there must be many more who have had no such luck. A few plays of Sophocles were saved
by an Alexandrian grammarian; Traherne, lost for almost three centuries, turned up in a London
bookstall and benefited from the revival of interest in early seventeenth-century poetry that was
gaining strength at the time of the discovery. There is no intrinsic preservative, but somebody
at some point must have thought these were good things, and so began the history of their
success. This person need not be a professional scholar, and very often isn't: the rediscovery of
Botticelli was effected by persuasive amateurs (and was often based on paintings that weren't
by Botticelli). But once retrieved, the works are kept alive by conversation, eventually supported
by serious scholarship.
AESTHETICS OF CANON, supra note 291, at 34.
339. See, e.g., Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 78.
340. For his latest intellectual book (soon, no doubt, to be eclipsed by another of his stream of books), see
CATASTROPHE, supra note 1.
Winter 2006]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
stop reading Posner's dissenting opinions because, as Professor Frederick Schauer
has argued, appellate opinions should not be viewed as "consumption items for law
professors, as evidence of the creative intelligence of their authors, or as objects of
aesthetic pleasure."' Is Schauer right when he contends that "the number of people
who actually read judicial opinions is likely decreasing," and those who do "read"
the opinions increasingly use computer-assisted search techniques to extract
"chunks" of usable language to insert into legal briefs? 342 Fourth, would Judge
Posner's dissenting opinions gain as much attention if he were a state court appellate
judge? Fifth, is the "buzz" surrounding Judge Posner's qualifications to be elevated
to a Supreme Court Justice343 a reason for present or future canonicity of his
dissenting opinions as a federal circuit judge? What if Judge Posner becomes Justice
Posner? What if he stays Judge Posner?
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Richard A. Posner's dissenting opinion oeuvre, from his first days on the
federal appellate bench through 2003 are, in general, a fascinating window on the
mind of a brilliant appellate judge. During his over-two-decades (and counting)
tenure as a judge, Posner's overarching style of dissent can be characterized as
pragmatic dissent-one that skillfully and effectively uses a variety of rhetorical
techniques in the service of pellucidly articulated substantive principles of law and
animated arguments of justice to achieve practical ends of litigating parties
embedded within social and political groups. Judge Posner's pragmatic dissenting
style, however, has evolved in his more recent dissenting opinions to exhibit two
key strains of practical reason: (1) humanistic dissent, wherein Posner champions
an unpopular or underdog litigant with language of benevolence, kindness, and
sympathy, and (2) legalistic dissent, wherein he advocates the advisability of making
hard judicial decisions to exercise restraint, to grapple with the enlightened meaning
of a statute, or to think through a sound gloss on a Supreme Court doctrine. In both
his humanistic dissenting and legalistic dissenting sub-styles, Judge Posner has
exhibited practical reason in his finest opinions by deftly situating the controversy
between the polar extremes of logicality and emotionalism.
As we reflect on the very best of Posner's dissenting style (and, alas, he, from
time-to-time, continues to fire off occasional dissenting duds that lack panache andjar our aesthetic sensibilities), it is edifying to realize how a handful of Posnerian
dissents helps us to better understand judicial canonicity. Steering around
ideological debates of what might be deemed "great" dissenting opinions, studying
Posner's evolving dissenting judicial style can help legal scholars achieve richer
understandings of how aesthetic pleasure impacts what we in the legal community
341. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 1455, 1456 (1995).
342. Id. at 1471-72.
343. See supra note 4. While it may be too early to tell, some of Posner's dissenting opinions (along with his
majority and concurring opinions) have probably become canonical because of his "superstar" judicial status-a
status that has come about for a variety of reasons (such as his prolific output of opinions and scholarly writings,
the unique and aesthetically pleasing style of his writings, the range of his intelligence, and his candor). Thus, I
contend that-like Holmes, Cardozo, and Brandeis before him-Posner's dissents have started to overshadow the
majority opinions of his colleagues because of his extraordinary ethos.
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find to be important, how these perceptions of pleasure can change over time, and
how chance works in the formation of the judicial canon.
